Re: Analysis of trin00

From: Stefan Aeschbacher (stefanat_private)
Date: Thu Dec 09 1999 - 16:39:02 PST

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    Jacob Langseth wrote:
    >
    > Stefan Aeschbacher scribed:
    > > Hi
    > > here are some snort rules which could show the presence of a trin00
    >
    > The nature of these attacks do not lend themselves to an
    > easy defense; finding a master and retrieving its list of
    > clients is currently one of the best, albeit proactive,
    > countermeasures.  By making rules to detect the master
    > available for a free IDS, you greatly improve the chances
    > of fighting the default configuration.  Thank you.
    
    I thought of the problem of fighting the default configuration and this
    is definitely a valuable point. I think that the (malicuous) people
    reading Bugtraq need a certain amount of technical knowledge and such
    a person will change the default configs. So this rules are mainly
    to protect against script-kiddies.
    Searching a master is definitely the better alternative but I have the
    problem that one of my servers is located in a subnet where I am not
    allowed to do any administrative actions on the other machines
    and the people there don't really care about security. (Yea, I should
    move this server to another location ;). I even assume a check for a
    master server could be regarded as an attack (If they notice it).
    So the only thing I (and probably some more people on this list) can
    do is listen for trin00.
    
    > I have a few suggestions, if I may.
    >
    > > alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 27665 (msg:"Trin00: Attacker to
    > > Master (default startup pass detected!)"; content:"betaalmostdone";))
    >
    > Trinoo uses crypt(3) to verify this password.  Stock crypt(3)
    > bases its one-way function on DES, which is limited to a 56-bit
    > key.  Passwords exceeding this length are truncated, making
    > "betaalmo" sufficient to authenticate.
    
    right, didn't think to far when I wrote this rule.
    
    > > alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 27665 (msg:"Trin00: Attacker to
    > > Master (default r.i. pass detected!)"; content:"gOrave";))
    >
    > The gOrave password is read via stdin during master startup,
    > making its occurance on the control channel highly unlikely.
    > (As gOrave is required for startup, it's verification takes
    > place before the control port is listening.)  I think this
    > rule may be safely dropped.
    
    right.
    thanks you for your corrections
    
    Stefan
    
    --
       Stefan Aeschbacher
       Federal Institute of Technology     Where do you want to go today?
       Lausanne Switzerland
       http://www.aeschbacher.ch/stefan       - NOT in your direction! -
    



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