Re: Reinventing the wheel (aka "Decoding Netscape Mail passwords")

From: Aleph One (aleph1at_private)
Date: Thu Dec 16 1999 - 20:01:53 PST

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    On Thu, Dec 16, 1999 at 01:33:10PM -0500, Tim Hollebeek wrote:
    >
    > In addition, the consequences of this flaw in a Windows environment are
    > substantially different, due to the lack of access controls.  As we
    > discussed in the technical summary, while there is no perfect solution to
    > this problem, it would take very little work for Netscape to make future
    > exploits of this type much more difficult.  The current position of
    > Netscape, that these sorts of vulnerabilities need not be fixed, is in my
    > opinion rather irresponsible.  Software companies have a responsibility to
    > make exploiting their software as difficult as possible, _especially_ in
    > cases like this where the cost to do so is similar to, or less than, the
    > cost of using absurdly weak proprietary cryptography.  It is Netscape's
    > responsibility to put the bar at as high a level as is feasible and
    > economical.  As Avi Rubin, security expert at ATT Labs, pointed out, in this
    > case Netscape needs to run out and get a bar so they can raise it.
    
    This is a red herring. Local secure storage of secrets in PCs without another
    secret is not possible. We've had this discussion before on the list in
    reference with many client applications (including Netscape). If you are
    using a known key a better encryption algorithm is useless. Regardless
    of the algorithm its nothing more than obfuscation.
    
    For encryption to be of any use you need to encrypt the information
    you want to maintain secret with yet another secret, but the user does
    not want to be bothered with remembering another password. That is the reason
    they ask the client application to remember their password in the first place.
    
    Local secure storage of secrets is a service that needs to be provided
    by the operating system. In the case of Windows NT you can store them
    (with some limitations) using the Local System Authority (LSA) API. Under
    Windows 95/98 there is an API to store secrets using the users logon password
    (stores the secrets in .PWL files) but to my knowledge it is not documented
    by Microsoft (although they allude to it in some early Windows 95 presentation
    slides). Maybe someone with more knowledge of Microsoft operating systems
    can confirm?
    
    So given these constrains the best thing Netscape can do is not use any
    obfuscation at all and store the passwords in plain text. At least this
    does not give the user any false sense of security.
    
    On a side note, I am surprised this made it into CNN. A dozen more
    serious vulnerabilities have been found in Netscape and Internet Explorer
    and they don't even notice, yet they pick up on this rather minor issue.
    Go figure.
    
    > Tim Hollebeek
    > Reliable Software Technologies
    
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