On Jan 22, 2:14pm, Vladimir Dubrovin wrote: } Subject: Re[4]: explanation and code for stream.c issues } Hello Don Lewis, } } 22.01.00 13:58, you wrote: explanation and code for stream.c issues; } } D> } Intruder sends SYN packet and then sends, lets say 1000 ACK packets to } D> } the same port from same port and source address. SYN packet will open } D> } ipfilter to pass all others packets. This attack doesn't need } D> } randomization for each packet. } } D> Instead of producing RST responses, this will produce ACKs. Your earlier } D> comment about this prompted my comment in another thread about the } D> possible need to rate limit ACK packets. } } This will not produce ACK packets, if ACK send by intruder doesn't } conform sequence number in the SYN/ACK response of victim. Original } stream.c used [snip] } But it's not principial - victim will reply RST for this packet in } most cases. Ok, you are correct. The attacker would have to guess or sniff the initial sequence number in order to produce a flood of ACK responses, so the stack is in better shape than I feared. I'm getting too tired to really analyze this, but I also think that repeatedly sending the original SYN (sorry for the pun) won't cause a flood of responses. I think the victim will periodically resend the SYN+ACK packet for which it expects an ACK.
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