Re: SAS behavior in Windows NT - RE: Windows 2000 Run As...

From: Jesper M. Johansson (jjohanssat_private)
Date: Wed Jan 26 2000 - 10:07:50 PST

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    >Compare the following quotes
    >"you can provide custom code that participates in the logon process AND
    >that controls the user interface for Logging on" - Paula Tomlinson WDJ
    
    That in and of itself is not new, and I don't read this as her saying
    that the key sequence is trappable. All she is saying is that you can
    write a custom GINA. Novell has been doing that for a long time to
    provide a single logon to an NT Workstation and a Novell Server. ZEN
    Works can even create the NT user account on the fly and delete it when
    the user logs off. So, this is not really earth-shattering.
    
    >"(In order to prevent password capture) "This key sequence cannot be
    >duplicated by an application programs" NT Security Handbook by Hadfield
    
    The key sequence itself does not protect against password capture by a
    trojan. It simply ensures that whatever is registered as the GINA is
    launched.
    
    The problem is that I can write a trojan that presents the logon dialog
    box without the key sequence. I can run that trojan under my own
    account. Joe DumbUser now shows up, sees the logon box and types in his
    username and password WITHOUT first doing the three-finger salute. My
    trojan writes his info to disk, puts up a dialog that says, password
    incorrect and asks him to press OK. He does that, and the trojan now
    logs him off and presents the real GINA. I have actually seen an entire
    lab with this kind of trojan on it.
    
    Now, can the three-finger salute key sequence be trapped? I'm not sure.
    However, if I can write my own GINA, which is not very hard, and replace
    the system one, it becomes a moot point.
    
    > there is no
    >documentation which widely advises not surfing the web under the
    >Administrator account (I know that NO one here does that anyway:) ) in
    >order to prevent an overflow in your browser(an app running with
    sufficient
    >privs) to do the damage.
    
    If you are looking at specifically surfing the web, I don't know of one
    either. But the ones worth anything advice against running routinely as
    an Admin. Sutton does in the NSA guide, on page 22. The SANS
    Step-by-Step guide does too (step 0.1). I think I even saw something
    coming out of Redmond saying that, although I believe it was just an
    e-mail from Paul Leach.
    
    Jesper M. Johansson
    



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