Future of s/key (Re: S/Key & OPIE Database Vulnerability)

From: Frasnelli, Dan (dfrasnelat_private)
Date: Wed Jan 26 2000 - 21:59:35 PST

  • Next message: Eivind Eklund: "Re: S/Key & OPIE Database Vulnerability"

    > Ultimately I wonder how much of a future S/Key has now that SSH and
    > similar utilities are widely deployed and provide much more
    > sophisticated protections, especially session encryption.
    
    Discussing how one could displace the other is not logical -
    ssh and s/key address two distinct security challenges.
    ssh by itself provides advanced confidentiality and basic
    authentication; s/key by itself provides advanced authentication
    and no confidentiality.  Suggesting ssh may replace s/key is
    like saying "telnet might replace /bin/login".
    
    The future of s/key is probably what it always has been: an otp
    supplement to the basic Un*x password authentication, regardless
    of what the access method (ssh, rsh, serial terminal) is.
    Some sites I have worked with implement both:
    - enforced rsa authentication for remote access via ssh
    - s/key authentication for privileged account access.
    
    No security technology or procedure is ultimately secure; it's just
    a matter of time before l0pht cracks it.
    
    Regards,
    --
    Dan Frasnelli
    Security analyst
    



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