fam Vulnerability

From: SGI Security Coordinator (agent99at_private)
Date: Wed Mar 01 2000 - 17:45:54 PST

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    ______________________________________________________________________________
                              SGI Security Advisory
    
            Title:   fam Vulnerability
            Title:   NAI-0016: Silicon Graphics IRIX fam service
            Number:  20000301-01-I
            Date:    March 1, 2000
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    
    SGI provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its
    consideration, interpretation, implementation and use.   SGI recommends
    that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
    
    SGI provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis
    only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied
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    or fitness for a particular purpose.  In no event shall SGI be liable for
    any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect,
    special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising
    from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions
    or information in this Security Advisory.
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    
    
    As a followup to the NAI Advisory #16: "Silicon Graphics IRIX fam service",
    SGI has investigated and has open sourced fam which includes the fix
    to this vulnerability.
    
    
    - -----------------------
    - --- Issue Specifics ---
    - -----------------------
    
    The fam daemon is an RPC server that tracks changes to the filesystem.
    
    NAI has reported that a vulnerability has been discovered in fam which
    allows an attacker to learn the names of files and directories on IRIX
    systems.
    
    SGI has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for
    neutralizing the exposure.  It is recommended that these measures
    be implemented on all vulnerable SGI systems running the fam service.
    
    
    - --------------
    - --- Impact ---
    - --------------
    
    The fam daemon is installed by default on all versions of IRIX 5.X and
    IRIX 6.X.
    
    A local user account on the vulnerable system is not required in order to
    exploit the fam daemon.
    
    The vulnerability can be exploited remotely by using carefully crafted RPC
    packets that are sent to the fam daemon.
    
    The vulnerability leads to unauthorized access to the names of files
    and directories on an IRIX system.
    
    This vulnerability was reported by Network Associates, Inc. in
    Advisory NAI-0016:
    http://www.nai.com/nai_labs/asp_set/advisory/16_fam_adv.asp
    
    This vulnerability has been publicly discussed in Usenet newsgroups
    and mailing lists.
    
    
    - --------------------------
    - --- Temporary Solution ---
    - --------------------------
    
    Although a version of fam which fixes this vulnerability is available
    as open source, it is realized that there may be situations where
    compiling and installing the new version may not be possible.
    
    The steps below can be used to disable the fam daemon.
    
          =================
          **** WARNING ****
          =================
    
          Disabling fam daemon will impact and/or disable applications that
          use the RPC-based fam daemon. This includes fm, mailbox, mediad,
          scanners, sysmon , fxbuilder, IRIS Annotator and applications like
          MediaMail that linked with the libfam.a static library.
    
    
         1) Become the root user on the system.
    
                    % /bin/su -
                    Password:
                    #
    
    
         2) Comment out the fam service in /etc/inetd.conf
    
                    # vi /etc/ined.conf
    
            Change the line:
            sgi_fam/1   stream  rpc/tcp wait    root    ?/usr/etc/fam     fam
    
            To:
            #sgi_fam/1   stream  rpc/tcp wait    root    ?/usr/etc/fam    fam
    
            and save the file.
    
    
         3) Restart inetd..
    
                    # /etc/killall -HUP inetd
    
    
         4) Kill any running fam daemon
            NOTE: This may disable applications that use fam including
            MediaMail.
    
                    # /etc/killall fam
    
    
         5) Return to previous level.
    
                    # exit
                    %
    
    
    - ----------------
    - --- Solution ---
    - ----------------
    
    SGI has open sourced the fam daemon and the source code is available from:
    http://oss.sgi.com/projects/fam/
    
    The open source version of fam has a fix for this vulnerability.
    
    Patches are being built for currently supported IRIX operating systems
    and this advisory will be updated when these patches are made
    available.
    
    The fam vulnerability is scheduled to be fixed in IRIX 6.5.8
    
    
    - ------------------------
    - --- Acknowledgments ---
    - ------------------------
    
    SGI wishes to thank the Network Associates, Inc. for their assistance
    in this matter.
    
    
    - -----------------------------------------
    - --- SGI Security Information/Contacts ---
    - -----------------------------------------
    
    If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
    cse-security-alertat_private
    
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    ______________________________________________________________________________
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