Re: Linux patches to solve /tmp race problem

From: Crispin Cowan (crispinat_private)
Date: Mon Apr 23 2001 - 17:50:39 PDT

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    "Donaldson, Matthew" wrote:
    
    > I disagree.  You might not like the design behind it, but that does not mean
    > there isn't any.  Just because it is not in a kernel module doesn't mean it
    > is inherently un-designed and bad.  In fact, a lot of thought has gone into
    > its design.
    
    Perhaps instead of battling to get the kernel maintainers to accept this patch,
    you'd consider actually making it a module.  We're working on a Linux Security
    Module (LSM) extension to the existing module interface, precisely so that the
    kernel maintainers don't have to wrangle with whether or not to accept a given
    security patch.
    
    If you're interested in modularizing your work, then we need your input on what
    hooks the LSM should provide to modules.  E.g. some discussion today came up about
    whether we have sufficient hooks in place to support Solar Designer's "don't let
    suid programs follow symlinks in stickbit dirs" patch.  We need your input on the
    LSM interface if it is to support your enhancement.
    
    Subscribe here  http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
    
    Crispin
    
    --
    Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.
    Chief Scientist, WireX Communications, Inc. http://wirex.com
    Security Hardened Linux Distribution:       http://immunix.org
    



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