Re: Mail delivery privileges (was: Solaris /usr/bin/mailx exploit)

From: Greg A. Woods (woodsat_private)
Date: Fri May 18 2001 - 19:16:56 PDT

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    [ On Friday, May 18, 2001 at 21:04:33 (-0400), Steven M. Bellovin wrote: ]
    > Subject: Re: Mail delivery privileges (was: Solaris /usr/bin/mailx exploit) 
    >
    > That's more an artifact of Plan 9 than of upas -- upas on Unix did 
    > support 'Pipe to'.  But Plan 9 has no notion of setuid nor (as I 
    > recall) of superuser, so it can't do that.
    
    Of course....  (you remember correctly, there's no super-user in Plan 9
    -- the user who boots a workstation, and thus logs in first, is
    essentially it's privileged user and owns most devices and can control
    all processes)
    
    BTW, I have found reference now to what I was thinking of in SysVr4.
    It's mail_pipe(1M), and indeed:
    
           mail_pipe  is  installed  as  a  privileged  process  thus
           enabling  itself to change it's user and group ids to that
           of the recipient as necessary.
    
    This is from 4.2, and I may have been thinking of 4.0, though even there
    it may have been setuid-root too and I can no longer check.
    
    >  And while there are 
    > certainly security issues with delivery to programs (that's why 
    > sendmail had to implement smrsh), not having write ability to per-user 
    > files causes problems for programs like 'vacation'.
    
    I have in the past implemented a "central" vacation facility that used a
    single shared database to keep track of which addresses it had sent
    replies to on a per-user basis.  Such applications do require a central
    system facility and this obviously doesn't solve the more general
    problem.
    
    There is another obvious trick too -- the user can install his own
    setuid program such that when the LDA invokes it the user's privileges
    are taken on.  Obviously there are many problems with this trick, but it
    does avoid the need to make the LDA run as root.  ;-)
    
    -- 
    							Greg A. Woods
    
    +1 416 218-0098      VE3TCP      <gwoodsat_private>     <woodsat_private>
    Planix, Inc. <woodsat_private>;   Secrets of the Weird <woodsat_private>
    



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