RE: Mitigating some of the effects of the Code Red worm

From: Bragg Michael (npl1mcb) (npl1mcbat_private)
Date: Fri Jul 20 2001 - 06:35:26 PDT

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    Also, let's not forget that Max Vision got sent up the river for something
    similar.  Plain and simple, there's no such thing as a "beneficial" worm --
    besides, how would *you* like it if you received a message saying, "Hi.  You
    don't know me from Adam, but I just patched your webserver against the
    latest vulnerability.  I didn't throw in any trapdoors or any other bad
    stuff.  Scout's honor."
    
    Besides, even the best of intentions sometimes goes straight to crap.  Sure,
    the code you wrote may have tested just fine on your box, but Alice's
    webserver crashes instantly upon exposure, and Bob's starts to BSoD at
    random times afterwards.  Legally it's a violation of (I think -- please
    correct me if I'm wrong) 18 USC 1030, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 1986.
    That's assuming it works as planned.  If it starts to DoS webservers, you
    could be held civilly liable for the business impact.
    
    Ethically, it's pretty much unconscionable. Just because we *can* take
    advantage of vulnerabilities, it doesn't necessarily follow that we
    *should*.  The possible for damage or misuse far outweighs any potential
    benefits.
    
    Just my $0.02, as always, I welcome any comments/flames/voodoo curses...
    
    Mike
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: LARD BENJAMIN LEE [mailto:Benjamin.Lardat_private]
    Sent: Thursday, July 19, 2001 7:11 PM
    To: BUGTRAQ
    Subject: Mitigating some of the effects of the Code Red worm
    
    
    I'm not sure of the ethical or legal aspects of this, but I don't see why
    we can't take advantage of three facts:
    
    1) There is something of an ongoing log of affected machines that can be
    obtained from boxes earlier in the IP list.
    2) Machines which have been compromised can STILL be compromised.
    3) The worm has a "lysine deficiency" which can be remotely introduced.
    
    What I'm getting at, is for someone to create another exploit that creates
    the C:\notworm file in infected machines and does something to
    notify whoever is in charge of a particular box (even something as simple
    as placing you_are_hacked.txt and a link to the patch on the desktop could
    be beneficial). Even better, an exploit to patch a machine (through
    removing the .ida and .idq extensions) would prevent the inevitable wave
    of post-attacks (both from this worm and future attacks).
    
    Of course, I'm guessing this is illegal, although I highly doubt you'd be
    prosecuted. If someone has the expertise to create a "white hack" such as
    this, I'm sure there are daring admins out there who would happily attempt
    to stem the flow. If we don't do something, you know it's just a (very
    short) matter of time before script kiddies, armed with a modified worm
    and a log of infected machines, do something more sinister.
    
    Ben Lard
    University of Colorado, Boulder
    



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