Re: [vor] Re: Can we afford full disclosure of security holes?

From: Richard Forno (rfornoat_private)
Date: Fri Aug 10 2001 - 12:50:01 PDT

  • Next message: Chris Wolfe: "Re: Can we afford full disclosure of security holes?"

    Security through obscurity does not work.
    
    Folks need to understand that vendors will not openly fix problems in a
    timely fashion unless brought to the community attention first, thus
    spurring a concern to fix the problem to avoid future problems in general,
    and also reduce the chances of new ones once word of the exploit gets out.
    It's not a smooth process, but a necessary evil and an acceptable de facto
    compromise between the two.
    
    Those that make the Gloom-And-Doom position that the public discussion of
    vulnerabilities is bad for the Internet are living in a fantasy world. Just
    because the "politically-correct" method is to fork over large sums to be
    part of a Vunerability Club of vendors - or ONLY tell the vendor - does not
    mean that such information will not get out into the world. I don't need to
    go into the social ramifications that the Internet has brought to the world
    of communications. 
    
    Think of software as a subscription - you pay for it up front, but you're at
    the mercy of the vendor's schedule and decision whether or not to address
    any problems that are reported to them. In such a case - which is what
    several propose - unless external pressure is placed on the vendor - through
    the community's common concern and discussion in forums free from vendor
    control and subjectivity - I wager most of the problems would never get
    addressed, the exploits will remain, and folks will carry on none the wiser,
    but still at risk. Software vendors would LOVE such a situation.
    
    How many sites were impacted by a vulnerability between the time CERT or a
    vendor received word of the exploit until the time they actually release a
    public warning? Most system administrators I wager, would prefer to know
    about potential problems IMMEDIATELY so they can monitor or take preventive
    measures to protect themselves......and not "fiddle while Rome burns" and
    their networks get compromised. Once news of a vulnerability is public
    knowledge, it is incumbent on system admins to act on that analysis and
    patch their systems.
    
    More to the point, community discussion of security vulnerabilities and
    exploits is perhaps the public's best guarantee that someone is looking out
    for THEIR interests and not just corporate profits....the peer review of
    products outside of the vendor's control - through any number of open,
    interactive, free lists, forums, and sites - provides a "check and balance"
    to vendor claims that their products are secure, stable, and reliable. Once
    word of a problem spreads, the community consensus (and media reports of
    such) typically spurs the vendor to address the issue.
    
    Otherwise, we're forced to trust the vendor's word that their products are
    secure, reliable, and safe.......and we all know that major software
    companies are more concerned with making money and insuring their
    marketplace positions than they are on producing secure, robust, and
    reliable software. The real world has Underwriters' Labs, Consumers Reports,
    and any number of third-party test and evaluation organizations......in the
    intertwined world of the internet and software, we have full disclosure
    discussion lists not under the thumb of software vendors.....sort of a
    "peer-review Underwriters' Lab" for software and network technologies.
    
    That's why UCITA and DMCA are so popular with the software industry. Rather
    than actually do good QA on products before they go out the door, or take
    responsibility for a product's fallacies when it's discovered in the world,
    they prefer to litigate the problem away, at the expense of the US taxpayers
    and the public's safety.
    
    Security through obscurity doesn't work, and any attempt to develop
    exclusive fee-based exclusive membership Vulnerability Clubs will only
    obfuscate, not clarify and assist, the examination and resolution of
    security issues.
    
    Just my 2 cents....
    
    
    rf
    
    
    
    Richard Forno
    infowarrior.org / incidentresponse.com
    



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