Re: qmail starttls patch does not seed the random number generator

From: Scott Renfro (scottat_private)
Date: Thu Aug 16 2001 - 10:22:10 PDT

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    On Wed, Aug 15, 2001 at 01:42:05PM -0400, Jack Lloyd wrote:
    > 
    >   2) IIRC, OpenSSL adds a few "random" things like pid, uid, time, etc
    > in the creation of the key
    
    On ''Unix'' platforms, it adds getpid(), getuid(), and time(NULL).
    Wagner and Goldberg demonstrated how very predictable these values were
    years ago with the Netscape browser.
    
    >   3) Oh, one more thing. An SSL/TLS key is negotiated between the
    > client and server, and derived from random values sent by each of
    > them.
    
    But the client-random and server-random values are public.  The only
    secret input to the master secret is the pre-master secret which is
    entirely supplied by the client.  If the PRNG used by the client to
    generate the pre-master secret is weak, an attacker that can sniff the
    packets can decrypt them with relatively little effort.
    
    In this case, you have to have a working and recognized-by-OpenSSL
    /dev/urandom or an alternate source of good entropy.
    
    --Scott
    
    -- 
    Scott Renfro <scottat_private>
    



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