W32/BadTrans.B-mm [Was: File extensions spoofable in MSIE download dialog]

From: http-equivat_private
Date: Mon Nov 26 2001 - 20:45:10 PST

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    "Jouko Pynnonen" <joukoat_private> wrote in message > 
    
     
    > The flaw has been successfully exploited with Internet Explorer 5.5 and
    > 6. An IE5 with the latest updates shows the spoofed file name and
    > extension without a sign of EXE, and issue no Security Warning dialog
    > after the file download dialog.
    
     
    > VENDOR STATUS
    > 
    > Microsoft was contacted on November 19th. The company doesn't currently
    > consider this is a vulnerability; they say that the trust decision should
    > be based on the file source and not type. The origin of the file, ie. the
    > web server's hostname can't be spoofed with this flaw. It's not known
    > whether a patch is going to be produced. Microsoft is currently
    > investigating the issue.
    
    This is interesting, but not surprising. Couple hours ago, we received two
    copies of the new: W32/BadTrans.B-mm and taking a closer look we found the
    following:
    
    1. A lot of noise is being made about how the vulnerability that this uses
    is old, and that many patches, service packs, warnings, other i-worms
    utilising the vulnerability have come and gone, yet there is wide-scale
    spreading of this variant today.
    
    2. The two copies we received were from Outlook Express 6.00 mail clients.
    How can that be? They are not vulnerable to the so-called: audio/x-wav MIME
    IFRAME Outlook Express vulnerability.
    
    3. What we found was precisely as you describe above, as what was discussed
    and demonstrated over 12 months ago, and as recent as 3 months ago:
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/3271, and as the vendor continuously claims
    as above.
    
    4. In the case of Outlook Express 6 [and probably the others, even the
    patched others], the W32/BadTrans.B-mm uses *.scr or *.pif files
    [S3MSONG.DOC.scr]
    
    5. We found that a *.scr file incorporated in an IFRAME, does in fact
    execute after only the single 'open it' or 'save it' attachment warning.
    There is no second 'SECURITY WARNING', simply accepting the generic
    attachment warning dialogue runs the *.scr without any other warning. *.exe
    won't run.
    
    Working Example [harmless "windows flower pot" screen saver]:
    
    http://www.malware.com/badtranceman.zip
    
    This is simple not acceptable. Guaranteed there are generic folk out there
    who know nothing, and will open that attachment warning out of curiosity, be
    it that their mail client Outlook Express 5.00 patched, 5.5 patched, 6.00
    patched. The current proliferation can surely be based on that [as well].
    
    The warning dialogue is just not good enough for executable file
    attachments. A clear safety warning must follow the single, simple 'open it'
    or 'save it' flimsy attachment warning. It is grossly unfair to the
    clientele this vendor caters to and contributes to the destruction of the
    internet infrastructure as a whole adding to making it unsafe for everyone. 
    
    Please don't sell the nice little children shiny bright toys with toxic
    parts that fall off that they can swallow and then claim they ought to know
    better and not put it in their mouths.
    
    references:
    
    http://www.malware.com/carolclickme.html
    http://www.malware.com/yoko.html
     
    
    side irritational note: there is nothing more pleasurable than scratching
    out 3/4 of this communication, then having the Windows operating system
    freeze on you, hard reboot and start all over again.
    
    side technical AV note: the W32/BadTrans.B-mm copies received are not
    actually being sent through/by the mail client. They're in X-Unsent: 1 state
    which means Message Composition State in Outlook Express, no doubt it's
    clear to the AV experts it's using it's own SMTP engine but the headers and
    boundary lines aren't of OE vintage, also each copy arrived with a zero byte
    *.txt file attachment as well as the payload. It all appears to be a
    peculiar construction.
    
    simple solution: SWITCH OF HTML IN THE EMAIL CLIENT !
    
    
    ---
    http://www.malware.com
    
    
    
    
    
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