Re: TCP Connections to a Broadcast Address on BSD-Based Systems

From: David Maxwell (davidat_private)
Date: Thu Mar 21 2002 - 12:11:45 PST

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    On Saturday, Mar 16th, Crist J. Clark sent a message to the bugtraq
    list, with the subject 'TCP Connections to a Broadcast Address on
    BSD-Based Systems'.
    
    Foremost, the NetBSD Security-Officer Team would like to thank Crist for
    following the bugtraq-recommended proceedure by contacting the affected
    vendors and giving time to reply before posting. Crist's message did
    start internal discussion about the issue, and vulnerability testing,
    but unfortunately, we managed to fail to send Crist a reply. 
    
    The NetBSD Security-Officer Team is putting additional tools in place to
    track correspondence, and ensure that this does not happen again. Mail
    sent to security-officerat_private should receive a human response
    within 24 hours.
    
    We will release a formal NetBSD Security Advisory for this issue. The
    Advisory will preceed pullups of code to the NetBSD 1.4 and 1.5 release
    branches, since a workaround is available without them. Connections to
    broadcast addresses can be blocked with ipfilter rules, such as:
    
    block in quick on fxp0 from any to 192.168.1.0/32
    block in quick on fxp0 from any to 192.168.1.255/32
    
    Use rules like these for the case where fxp0 is the interface you desire
    to block on, and the only address on the interface is in the subnet
    192.168.1.0/24. Rules like this should be repeated for each subnet on
    the interface, for each interface of concern on the host.
    
    Lastly, these rules are needed only on a host where it is intended that
    a particular service is available on some interfaces and not others.
    Where possible, use a daemon with the facility to bind only to specified
    interfaces, and add filter rules as a second layer of protection, if
    desired.
    
    We recommend reviewing current filter rules to ensure they cover the
    intended security model for the networks the host participates in.
    
    					The NetBSD Security-Officer Team
    
    
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