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Cisco Security Advisory: Solaris /bin/log vulnerability
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2002 April 10 16:00 (UTC+0000)
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Contents
Summary
Products Affected
Details
Impact
Software Versions and Fixes
Obtaining Fixed Software
Workarounds
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of This Notice
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
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Summary
=======
This advisory describes a vulnerability that affects Cisco products and
applications that are installed on the Solaris operating system, and is
based on the vulnerabilty of an common service within the Solaris operating
system, not due to a defect of the Cisco product or application. A
vulnerability in the "/bin/login" program was discovered that enables an
attacker to execute arbitrary code under Solaris OS. This vulnerability was
discovered and publicly announced by Internet Security Systems Inc. All
Cisco products and applications that are installed on Solaris OS are
considered vulnerable to the underlying operating system vulnerability,
unless steps have been taken to disable access services such as "bin/login".
We are investigating other Solaris based products.
This vulnerability can be mitigated in many cases (not all), by limiting
interactive logins to trusted hosts using access control list (ACL) or
other mechanisms such as firewalls.
This advisory is available at the
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/Solaris-bin-login.shtml
Products Affected
=================
All products and all releases that are running on top of Solaris OS are
vulnerable because the vulnerability is within Solaris and not within the
other applications.
Product not affected:
* PGW2200 release 9.2(2) running on Solaris 2.8 is not affected. The
installation CD set contains the package CSCOh015, version 2.0.1,
that includes the patch for this issue.
The following products are affected:
Media Gateway Controller (MGC) and Related Products
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+ Products running on Solaris 2.5.1 are vulnerable unless
CSCOh008.pkg release 1.0(8) has been installed. The product that is
based on this version of Solaris is Signaling Controler 2200
(SC2200).
+ Products running on Solaris 2.6 are vulnerable unless CSCOh007.pkg
release 1.0(7) has been installed. The products that are based on
this version of Solaris are:
o SC2200
o Cisco Virtual Switch Controller (VSC3000)
o Cisco PGW2200 Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) Gateway
o Cisco Billing and Management Server (BAMS)
o Cisco Voice Services Provisioning Tool (VSPT)
Cisco IDS product
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All releases of the Cisco Secure Intrusion Detection System (IDS,
formerly Netranger) up to, but excluding, 3.0(5)Sx where "5" is the
Service Pack and not the Signature Update field.
Other Cisco software applications may run on Solaris platforms and where
those products have not specifically been identified, customers should
install security patches regularly in accordance with their normal
maintenance procedures.
We are investigating other Solaris based products.
Details
=======
All implementations of the "login" program (also known as "/bin/login" due
to its location on the file system) derived from the SysV implementation
are vulnerable to a buffer overflow. This vulnerability can be exploited to
gain unauthorized access to a computer system without possessing legitimate
credentials. The only prerequisite for exploiting this vulnerability is to
have telnet or other remote login access to the computer. This
vulnerability can be exploited locally and remotely.
Impact
======
By gaining unauthorized access an attacker can view and modify any part of
the operating system possibly leading to a breach of confidentiality and
integrity of the system.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
MGC and Related Products
- ------------------------
+ For the SC2200 the package CSCOh008.pkg release 1.0(8) contains the
fix. The installation instruction is included within the package.
+ For the products based on Solaris 2.6 the package CSCOh007.pkg
release 1.0(7), or higher, contains the fix. The installation
instruction is included within the package. This is applicable to
the following products:
o SC2200
o Cisco Virtual Switch Controller (VSC3000)
o Cisco PGW2200 Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) Gateway
o Cisco Billing and Management Server (BAMS)
o Cisco Voice Services Provisioning Tool (VSPT)
Both packages are available at
http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/mgc-sol To follow the link
below, you must be a registered user and you must be logged in.
For all MGC and related products you may also consult the "Cisco
Security Advisory: Hardening of Solaris OS for MGC" located at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/Solaris-for-MGC-pub.shtml
Cisco IDS product
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For the IDS, the release 3.0(5) is the first fixed release. The fixed
software can be downloaded from
http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ids-appsens In order to
use that link, you must be a registered user and you must be logged in.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco is offering free software upgrades to eliminate this vulnerability
for all affected customers.
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's Worldwide Web
site at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or
existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco
Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that
support organization for assistance with the upgrade, which should be free
of charge.
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third party vendors but
are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows:
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll-free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tacat_private
Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for
non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Please do not contact either "psirtat_private" or
"security-alertat_private" for software upgrades.
Workarounds
===========
There is no workaround for MGC and related products.
For the IDS, it is possible to mitigate the exposure by limiting hosts that
can Telnet to the IDS. This procedure is described at: http://www.cisco.com
/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/iaabu/csids/csids6/12216_02.htm#xtocid1115811
In short, the user must login to the IDS machine as root, type
sysconfig-sensor at the prompt, select option 5 and enter the hosts allowed
to telnet to the sensor.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
This vulnerability has been discovered by ISS Inc. and has been disclosed
publicly. The advisories are published at:
* http://www.iss.net/security_center/alerts/advise105.php, and
* http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-34.html
Status of This Notice: INTERIM
==============================
This is an interim security advisory. Cisco anticipates issuing updated
versions of this notice at irregular intervals as there are material
changes in the facts, and will continue to update this notice as necessary.
The reader is warned that this notice may contain inaccurate or incomplete
information. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy of all statements
in this notice, all of the facts have been checked to the best of our
ability. Cisco anticipates issuing monthly updates of this notice until it
reaches FINAL status.
A standalone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled
copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This notice will be posted on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at http://
www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/Solaris-bin-login.shtml. In addition to
Worldwide Web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with
the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet
news recipients:
* cust-security-announceat_private
* bugtraqat_private
* first-teamsat_private (includes CERT/CC)
* ciscoat_private
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco
* firewallsat_private
* Various internal Cisco mailing lists
Future updates of this notice, if any, will be placed on Cisco's Worldwide
Web server, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or
newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the
URL given above for any updates.
Revision History
================
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|Revision 1.0|2001-April-10 16:00 UTC+0000|Initial public release|
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Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to
receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's Worldwide
Web site at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices.
All Cisco Security Advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
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This notice is Copyright 2002 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text,
provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, and include
all date and version information.
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