Next message: cluestickat_private: "Cluestick Advisory #000"
[ SecurityFocus: BID #5025 describes this issue; may it be noted that older
versions
are NOT vulnerable. ]
In Xitami 2.5 Beta, a GSL feature was implemented. GSL is an XML-type
server-side
language. Xitami demonstrates this with two sample scripts. Errors.gsl is
used for error
processing in servers where it has been enabled. (Disabled by default)
Errors.gsl poorly checks the hostname of the input request, only filtering
SCRIPT (case
insensitive filter) out of the host. So, events can be fired to run code:
http://www.=""%20ONERROR="alert(document.cookie)">.target.com/erro
r404
It also does not check the User-Agent field AT ALL:
[ telnet target.net 80 ]
GET / HTTP/1.0
User-Agent: <SCRIPT>alert(document.cookie);</SCRIPT>
[ End sent data ]
Xitami will return the script in the output. If an attacking page can
control the
User-Agent (or any part of it), it can run code on a visiting browser in the
name
of the site running the Beta.
Vendor: iMatix has forwarded my original post to the discussion forum, and
will
update the script in future beta releases.
References:
iMatix Home Page (iMatix)
http://www.imatix.com
Xitami Home Page (iMatix)
http://www.xitami.com
Other Issues:
Xitami Web Server Plaintext Administrator Password Storage (SecuriTeam [By
ace; shellcodeat_private])
Defaults.aut Displays Un-encrypted Admin Password
http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/5CP0M0A7FU.html
Xitami Reserved Device DoS Vulnerability (SecuriTeam [By neme-dhc;
neme-dhcat_private])
AUX Device Access Causes Server Hang
http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/5PP0R1F41O.html
Xitami CGI Processing Failure Vulnerability (SecuriTeam)
CGI Script Processing Error Allows Code Disclosure
http://www.securiteam.com/securitynews/5TP0L0075K.html
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: Thu Jun 27 2002 - 11:20:01 PDT