RE: XWT Foundation Advisory

From: Microsoft Security Response Center (secureat_private)
Date: Mon Jul 29 2002 - 15:38:27 PDT

  • Next message: Jim Paris: "Re: Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability in VanDyke SecureCRT 3.4 & 4.0 beta"

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    
    Hi All -
    
    We'd like to set the record straight as regards the advisory
    published today by the XWT Foundation.  Microsoft thoroughly
    investigated the issue described in the advisory, and discussed our
    findings in detail with the advisory's author.  When the XWT
    Foundation solicited a response from Microsoft to include in the
    advisory, we prepared one that accurately reports the risk the issue
    poses and the solution we developed.  It's a pity the XWT Foundation
    chose not to honor its promise to include our response.  For the
    record, this is the vendor response we provided:
    
    =====================================================================
    Microsoft has investigated the issue discussed in the report, and
    agrees that the issue is bona fide from a technical standpoint. 
    However, because of the difficulties associated with exploiting it
    (discussed below), Microsoft believes it is most appropriate to
    address the issue via a service pack.  Accordingly, a fix has been
    included in IE 6 Service Pack 1, which is due to be released shortly.
    
    Among the barriers that an attacker would face in attempting to
    exploit the vulnerability are the following:
    * It could only be exploited if the user clicked a link within an
    email - it could not be exploited without user interaction.
    * It would require that the attacker host a DNS server, a fact that
    would be traceable. 
    * The attacker would need detailed information about the internals of
    the user's network, such as intranet server names.
    * If the intranet site were an HTTPS: site, a dialog would warn the
    user that the name on the site's certificate did not match the domain
    name.
    * If the intranet site used cookie-based authentication, the attack
    would fail because the attacker's site would be unable to
    authenticate on behalf of the user
    * The attack would not work against web servers configured to support
    multiple host headers, with the exception of any content served up at
    the "default" site.
    ======================================================================
    =
    
    Microsoft stands by its assessment of the issue.  Regards,
    
    Microsoft Security Response Center
    
    
    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
    Version: PGP 7.1
    
    iQEVAwUBPUXCqo0ZSRQxA/UrAQEztAf/Y3qYCwMDTBSqZR0UrXTj4kA3m6bGWa2l
    6LlGtHdKlwtSxWvwdXjsapSbfdQhMthV2+onjWi2lGDS6eqzvKbqf2kzVBBf6mU7
    p8KxvgcpWGz3LLqQ1YtmLM7SuGgHayUq5ny6AlTMoYI0ZUMD8R9rVyRSM+CTMkQx
    irskV/2HbqmrA4K1BdTV59t6n96lA955KaQMfKChxjk/YmQuBb/77DO+UABEWpdE
    N3Sq2OgZOZxElLdBP3Yq/+sei6ixxH3g0UoAH+nOTTvYZDaizMWOPDnhVcwyx6mC
    R0lXp70xSB8OvUo89e27eLXz/FYmNBpv54b5gKGJ6HTzxl0YjjeolQ==
    =Uzha
    -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Mon Jul 29 2002 - 16:05:17 PDT