Nokia GGSN (IP650 Based) DoS

From: @stake Advisories (@stake)
Date: Mon Jun 09 2003 - 10:33:01 PDT

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                                  @stake Inc.
                                www.atstake.com
    
                               Security Advisory
    
    Advisory Name: Nokia GGSN (IP650 Based) DoS
     Release Date: 06/09/2003
      Application: Nokia GGSN (IP650 Based)
         Platform: Nokia GGSN (IP650 Based)
         Severity: An attacker is able to cause GGSN to kernel panic
          Authors: Ollie Whitehouse [ollieat_private]
                   Joe Grand      
                   Brian Hassick  
    Vendor Status: Informed/Fixed
    CVE Candidate: CAN-2003-0368 Nokia GGSN Kernel Panic
        Reference: www.atstake.com/research/advisories/2003/a060903-1.txt
    
    
    Overview:
    
           Nokia's (http://www.nokia.com) GGSN (Gateway GPRS support
    node)
    is the platform that exists between Gn and Gi networks within a GPRS
    network.
    
    There exists a vulnerability in the TCP stack that allows an
    attacker to cause the GGSN to kernel panic and shutdown. This
    potentially allows an attacker to crash all data connectivity within
    a GPRS based network.
    
    This is a good example of why network elements which introduce IP
    functionality to legacy networks should have their functionality
    verified in terms of impact on security before deployment in a
    production environment.
    
    Technical Overview:
    
            This vulnerability is exploited by sending a malformed
    IP packet with a TCP option of 0xFF over a cellphone to the affected
    network.
    
    Vendor Response:
    
            (see recommendation).
    
    
    Recommendation:
    
            @stake worked with Nokia to ensure that all affected
    operators
    were informed and upgraded and only after this time did @stake agree
    to release this information to the public. There should be no action
    on the part of the operator required.
    
    Below is the notice that was sent out by Nokia to their clients:
    
            ---[Nokia Notice]---
            NOKIA CUSTOMER CONFIDENTIAL, GGSN RELEASE 1 VULNERABILITY
    
            Under exceptional circumstances Nokia GGSN release 1 is
            potentially vulnerable to a "Denial Of Service" style of
            attack from a malicious user equipped with a computer and a
            mobile phone. When the vulnerability is exploited the GGSN
            restarts. There is no damage to the configuration, but some
            charging data may be lost.  Changing a normal Access Point to
            tunneled (GRE or IP in IP) prevents the attacks from mobile
            user side.
    
            The same applies for the Gi interface though routers and
            firewalls would normally drop this kind of packets. The
            problem has been detected and reported by @stake and has been
            reproduced by Nokia in collaboration with @stake. Nokia and
            @stake are jointly working to eliminate the problem.
    
            This vulnerability is corrected in IPSO version 3.4 and all
            subsequent versions. Thus, GGSN release 2 is not vulnerable,
            GGSN release 1 is. Nokia advices all the customers still
            running GGSN release level 1 to upgrade on GGSN release level
          
            2.
     
            As an interim measure operators can perform the following
            preventative configuration changes to their networks. Ensure
            that all IP packets  with non standard IP options are dropped
            by boarder firewalls on the  Gi interface. Within the Gn
            network ensure that the GTP aware firewall (if present) also
            drops all encapsulated IP packets with non standard  IP
            options. This may introduce latency however it will mitigate
            against the attack until the patch has been fully deployed
            and tested.
    
            Due to the severity of this vulnerability @stake has
            confirmed that they will not be releasing this information
            publicly on their research page
            (http://www.atstake.com/research/)
            until Nokia has confirmed that all affected operators have
            fully patched and tested all affected elements. However
            @stake would ideally like to  release this information no
            later than 1st June 2003.
    
            Neither @stake nor Nokia are aware of this attack being used
            in the wild as it was discovered by @stake within a lab
            environment and subsequently tested on a number of operators
            for whom they have worked for.
            ---[End Nokia Notice]---
    
    
    Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information:
    
    The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned
    the following names to these issues.  These are candidates for
    inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes
    names for security problems.
    
      CAN-2003-0368 Nokia GGSN Kernel Panic
    
    
    @stake Vulnerability Reporting Policy:
    http://www.atstake.com/research/policy/
    
    @stake Advisory Archive:
    http://www.atstake.com/research/advisories/
    
    PGP Key:
    http://www.atstake.com/research/pgp_key.asc
    
    @stake is currently seeking application security experts to fill
    several consulting positions.  Applicants should have strong
    application development skills and be able to perform application
    security design reviews, code reviews, and application penetration
    testing.  Please send resumes to jobsat_private
    
    Copyright 2003 @stake, Inc. All rights reserved.
    
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