Re: [RE: CRIME Re: TIPS]

From: Sarah Mocas (sarah@private)
Date: Fri Jul 19 2002 - 12:20:06 PDT

  • Next message: Christiansen, John (SEA): "RE: [RE: CRIME Re: TIPS]"

    Thanks for your well thought out arguments!  I especially appreciate 
    your comments on the practical considerations of mass data collection 
    and use.  As was shown with the Clipper Chip (NSA's crypto/key escrow 
    system), the complexity of implementing a solution goes far beyond the 
    original idea.  If the cost is too high, the ability to circumvent or 
    misuse the mechanism too easy and the social reaction highly mixed then 
    the solution may need rethinking.
    
    Sarah 
    
    > 
    > My POV is that it has always been the case that anyone - cable guy, phone
    > installer, whomever - has had the ability and right to report apparent
    > criminal activity to law enforcement authorities, and that this is a good
    > thing. The difference here would seem to be that such reporting is being
    > specifically encouraged, and a centralized federal reporting and data
    > collection function is being established.
    > 
    > There are many potential cultural and social problems with formal,
    > officially sanctioned citizen spy "suspicious activity" reporting systems. I
    > won't comment on those, since they are the focus of most commentary, except
    > to note that the harm they do to social trust seems to considerably exceed
    > their short term national security and/or law enforcement benefits. The
    > Soviet Union and its allies implemented them extensively; the U.S. has only
    > done so sporadically and never comfortably; who's standing now? (Lack of
    > trust was IMO probably *the* single biggest factor in the collapse of
    > Communism.)
    > 
    > But apart from these negative effects from a pure data collection and
    > management standpoint the concept seems fundamentally flawed. The analogy to
    > a neighbor calling local law enforcement when they see a potential criminal
    > event, like someone breaking into your house or you hitting your spouse, or
    > for that matter the cable guy stumbling across your marijuana grow operation
    > in the basement, doesn't work. This kind of situation generally resolves
    > through some kind of official fact-finding (either informally on the scene
    > or in formal proceedings) with an identifiable result (let go with a
    > warning, criminal conviction or finding of innocence, etc.).
    > 
    > A reporting system for "suspicious activity," however, is problematic from
    > start to finish. In the first place, what are TIPSters supposed to report? A
    > stash of AK-47s or a pamphlet titled "how to make a fertilizer bomb," yeah,
    > I'd probably like the cable guy to tell somebody official. The occupation of
    > an apartment by three swarthy guys who don't speak English very well and
    > have a copy of the Koran? Hmmmm . . . (A couple of weeks after 9/11 an
    > acquaintance whose judgment I have trusted - he's an educated professional -
    > told me that the day before he'd called the FBI because he'd observed a
    > group of Middle Eastern-looking men in a Starbucks who weren't speaking
    > English and "looked suspicious." I'm sure the local office was just thrilled
    > at this hot tip.) 
    > 
    > If only vague reporting criteria are used at best the vast majority of even
    > good faith reports will be false positives as far as identifying potential
    > homeland security threats is concerned - unlike the situation where your
    > neighbor observes an apparent crime in progress. This will only be made
    > worse by people who do not report in good faith, but do it out of some
    > personal grudge or bigotry, to try to get somebody they don't like in
    > trouble, and by nutcases and paranoids reporting their delusions. So we are
    > establishing a system for the collection of data of inherently unknown
    > quality.
    > 
    > And once collected what action will follow the reports? I assume some would
    > include facts indicating they should be investigated immediately, but I
    > would also expect most of these facts would indicate a possible crime anyway
    > (the stash of guns, etc.). In the absence of a lot of funding and
    > investigative staff to do fact-finding, however, I have to assume most
    > reports will not be investigated. 
    > 
    > But I expect they would nonetheless be put in a database in case they
    > correlate usefully with other information. This raises the question, then,
    > of when and how access to such data would be permitted. Only to a dedicated,
    > well-trained, highly ethical Homeland Security elite investigation team
    > (which does not currently exist and I don't think has been proposed)? To FBI
    > or other federal agents in the course of homeland security investigations?
    > To FBI or other law enforcement agents upon request at their discretion? To
    > state and local law enforcement upon request at their discretion? To
    > agencies or employers working on government projects needing to screen
    > employees for potential national security risks? For that matter, will data
    > subjects be allowed to know if it was used against them, or even know there
    > is a record, much less a right to review and collect it? Once you've got
    > data it becomes very tempting to use it, and in the absence of systems for
    > correction errors take on a life of their own.
    > 
    > This system will also tend to miss a lot. As I recall, the Unabomber had
    > neither cable nor a phone, and probably didn't even get meaningful mail;
    > Timothy McVeigh appears to have been sufficiently suspicious of society that
    > there probably weren't many suspicious indicators to the average citizen.
    > Any savvy terrorist (or criminal) - i.e. the really dangerous guys - will
    > quickly figure out not to invite TIPS types in, or to clean up suspicious
    > stuff first. People being the way they are it is no doubt the case that a
    > few suspicious activity reports would pick up dimwit wannabes or crazies who
    > do pose a genuine threat, someday if they can get their act sufficiently
    > together (cf. Padilla). But I wouldn't rest any easier at night knowing
    > we've got a system in place that can catch them while missing the real
    > threats. 
    > 
    > So TIPS appears to be a system for the collection of mostly unverified
    > personal data of unknown value, to be used under unspecified conditions, for
    > uses which might affect the reputation and/or employment (at least) of
    > subject individuals who may or may not have any right to know if it is being
    > used or what the content is. I may be wrong about the details here, of
    > course - I only know what I see in the papers - but if this is the case it
    > probably bears some pretty substantial public policy debate above and beyond
    > the "citizen spy" issue.     
    > 
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: J.Michael Cuciti [mailto:mcuciti@private]
    > Sent: Friday, July 19, 2002 8:33 AM
    > To: Goerling, Richard J. LT (TAD to CGIC Portland); crime@private
    > Subject: Re: [RE: CRIME Re: TIPS]
    > 
    > 
    > All:
    > 
    > Let me put in my $.02: Operation TIPS is an opportunity for millions of
    > ordinary citizens to assist law enforcement to track suspicious activities.
    > Citizen in the United States have always had the opportunity to assist law
    > enforcement agengies. If something did look right or was out of place,
    > citizens can call 911 to report it. There is no law or government program
    > for
    > any of us to do that.
    > 
    > What bothers me is the fact that the government may be or the citizens may
    > believe the government is condoning "spying" on your neighbors. Good
    > neighbors
    > watch out for their fellow neighbors and their property. Mine do. 
    > 
    > I'm sorry, but I see a bit of McCarthyism here and I'm concerned that some
    > "helpful" citizens will carry Operations TIPS too far.
    > 
    > Common sense and good jugdment should prevail.
    > 
    > Thanks for your time.
    > 
    > J. Michael (Mike) Cuciti
    > IT Support Manager
    > Washington State Department of Health
    > 
    > "Goerling, Richard J. LT (TAD to CGIC Portland)"
    > <RIGoerling@private> wrote:
    > > --------------------------------------------- 
    > >	Attachment:  
    > >	MIME Type: multipart/alternative 
    > > --------------------------------------------- 
    > Thanks to Todd for the good links re: OP TIPS.  I'm very interested in CRIME
    > members perspective.  This program was handed to the Coast Guard's National
    > Response Center by US DOJ to field the phone calls from the public.  I'll
    > have to reserve my comments for now, but please take a look at the program
    > and let me know what you think.  
    >  
    > Rich Goerling
    > US Coast Guard Portland, OR 
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Todd Ellner [mailto:tellner@private]
    > Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2002 2:17 PM
    > To: crime@private
    > Subject: CRIME Re: TIPS
    > 
    > 
    > 
    > Someone asked about operation TIPS. Below are a couple of relevant links:
    >  
    > http://www.aclu.org/news/2002/n071802b.html
    > http://www.aclu.org/news/2002/n071602a.html
    > <http://www.aclu.org/news/2002/n071602a.html> 
    > http://www.citizencorps.gov/tips.html
    > <http://www.citizencorps.gov/tips.html> 
    > http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63924-2002Jul12.html
    > <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63924-2002Jul12.html> 
    > http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/07/17/usps.operation.tip/index.html
    > <http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/07/17/usps.operation.tip/index.html> 
    > http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/07/17/operation.tips.ap/index.html
    > <http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/07/17/operation.tips.ap/index.html> 
    >  
    > Somewhere, in the back of my  mind, I hear an old, scratchy, Stalin-era
    > record playing "Comrades! Root out treason and imperialist subversion!
    > Complete the Five Year Plan in three years!"
    >  
    >  
    > . 
    > 
    > 			
    > 
    > 
    > 
    > 
    > 
    > 
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Jul 19 2002 - 13:28:47 PDT