Re: CRIME Checkpoint versus Sonicwall

From: Crispin Cowan (crispin@private)
Date: Wed Aug 28 2002 - 16:04:53 PDT

  • Next message: Andrew Plato: "RE: CRIME Checkpoint versus Sonicwall"

    Andrew Plato wrote:
    
    > > Money, scalability, speed: very nice. Uh, what about security? The
    > > Symantec product is a "hybrid" firewall (i.e. uses proxies) while the
    > > others are packet filters. IMHO, that adds security value.
    >
    > When it comes to security, I firmly believe that 75% to 90% of 
    > security is in the configuration, management, and use of a product, 
    > not the product itself.
    >
    That depends on the product. Some products (cars, hammers, guns) are 
    much easier to use badly than others (band-aids, apples, plush toys).
    
    A firewall, in particular, is a configuration engine, so in this case 
    its correct configuration is critical to its security. However, the 
    *expressiveness* of the configuration engine strongly impacts the 
    correctness of the configuration: a proxy firewall tends to "fail 
    closed", causing lack of network access. A packet filter tends to "fail 
    open", tending to create security vulnerabilities.
    
    > >That is also a role for secure operating systems (our products). IDS
    > >just tell you that you've just been had, and you're about to have a bad
    > >weekend :)
    >
    > Yes, I agree. There is a place for secure operating systems. But IDS 
    > can start to deliver information about what's going on, on your 
    > network. Firewalls and secure OS components may keep hackers out. But 
    > and IDS has the unique job of telling you if anybody is even trying. 
    > Moreover, good IDSs have the capabilty to archive intrusion data, 
    > hence giving you evidence of an intrusion.
    >
    True. But you have to be willing to invest the effort in hiring security 
    analysts to look at the data the IDS is generating.
    
    > Furthermore, not all IDS's are passive - "ruin your weekend" - type of 
    > systems. Some IDSs can also kill intrusions at the host, on the 
    > network, or at the gateway.
    >
    Elsewhere 
    <http://honor.icsalabs.com/pipermail/firewall-wizards/2002-August/012771.html>, 
    I have *vehemently* argued that "blocking IDS" (also known as "intrusion 
    prevention" or "inline IDS") are *bullshit* terms designed to distract 
    customers from the fact that this IDS is now acting in the capacity of 
    either a firewall (for "blocking" NIDS) or secure operating system (for 
    "blocking" HIDS).
    
    The problem is that IDS are flakey: they have a significant 
    false-positive rate. If you turn an IDS into a blocking IDS, you either 
    get a huge false-positive problem (if you think Raptor's proxies are 
    fussy, you ain't seen nothin' yet) or you have to turn the IDS's 
    sensitivity *way* down.
    
    People should be aware of what they are buying: "blocking NIDS" should 
    be properly called "signature firewalls", and compared against firewall 
    solutions. To some extent, industry is now recognizing this; Netscreen 
    (a firewall vendor) is acquiring OneSecure (an IDS vendor) to produce an 
    integrated gateway solution. At least it will be recognizable as a 
    firewall with IDS stuff in it.
    
    > This is actually one of my bigger complaints with Snort. As capable as 
    > it is, it has no integrated response capabilities other than to shoot 
    > off alerts. You'd have to custom build a response mechanism for it, 
    > which isn't easy.  
    >
    You should check out Inline Snort (nee Hogwash). This is precisely what 
    you describe: Snort with blocking capability, basically Snort acting as 
    a nifty, signature-based firewall. As above, they turned the sensitivity 
    of Snort way down, so that it only blocks things that they are damned 
    sure are intrusions.
    
    > Clearly there is a place for all these products. The real question in 
    > many people's minds are: what is necessary and what can I afford? 
    > That's a much harder question to answer.
    >
    Agreed. But IMHO IDS is on the expensive end of the spectrum. Not 
    because the technology is expensive (Snort is free, and arguably better 
    than most commercial solutions) but because of the expense of the human 
    incident analysts necessary to get any value out of IDS. IDS's are just 
    machines that spit out lists of suspicious events; you have to have 
    humans monitor them, or you might as well not bother.
    
    If you just want moderate, affordable security, stick strictly to 
    preventive technologies (firewalls, strong authentication, VPNs, 
    vulnerability scanners, and secure OS's) and leave the IDSs to people 
    with money to burn on security.
    
    Crispin
    
    -- 
    Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.
    Chief Scientist, WireX                      http://wirex.com/~crispin/
    Security Hardened Linux Distribution:       http://immunix.org
    Available for purchase: http://wirex.com/Products/Immunix/purchase.html
    



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