Re: CRIME Electronic Voting Security

From: Marc Schuette (mschuette@private)
Date: Thu Sep 11 2003 - 16:40:55 PDT

  • Next message: Zot O'Connor: "RE: CRIME More identity theft "goodness""

    statistical analysis would most likely show tampering on any large scale 
     >10% - even with voter apathy. i would also wonder how easy it would be 
    to get rid of 100's or 1000's of paper ballots without anyone noticing a 
    mail carrier 1)seperating ballots from the regular mail (LOTS of little 
    old ladies peaking out their windows at ALL times of the day/night 2)a 
    lack of ballots coming into the transfer station from a particular 
    carriers route 3)a lack of ballots coming in from a particular 
    route/area 4)do you shred and/or burn the ballots - if so you take a 
    chance on someone seeing you during the process of transporting them to 
    a discrete location and during the process in what is thought to be a 
    discrete location but really is not 5)if you don't destroy the ballots 
    but just dump them - how can you be sure no one finds them ever - 
    because if they do you are certainly going to be a suspect. lots of 
    stuff to think about which begs the question 'is this something that can 
    be done on a small scale or would one need a large operation?' if the 
    answer is a large operation then you have multiple people involved and 
    we all know that loose lips sink ships.
    
    Crispin Cowan wrote:
    
    > T.Kenji Sugahara wrote:
    >
    >> There is an assumption that is being made here.... the assumption is 
    >> that the mail carrier knows which choices are made on specific 
    >> ballots.  Otherwise, if the carrier misdirects mail from certain 
    >> districts the mail carrier could be misdirecting ballots that could 
    >> be in favor of the mail carrier's perspective.
    >
    >
    > The mail carrier attack depends on the mail carrier knowing the 
    > demographic of the district they're working, which is often less 
    > difficult than it might seem. For instance, a Democrat mail worker in 
    > Prineville or Pendleton could safely dump 40% of the ballots they are 
    > supposed to deliver, safe in the knowledge that most of them would 
    > have been Republican votes. The converse is true for liberal 
    > neighborhoods in Portland and Eugene.
    >
    >> If there is a larger disappearance from specific counties, then you 
    >> could make the argument that there is a higher statistical likelihood 
    >> that ballots favoring one party would more likely have disappeared.
    >
    >
    > But American voter turnout is so poor and so erratic that it would be 
    > hard to detect the attack. The attacking mail carrier has to balance 
    > how many ballots they lose against detection: lose 100% and it will be 
    > noticed, lose 10% and they have no impact, lose 40% and it may well work.
    >
    >>   However, to have that much of an impact, that sort of voter fraud 
    >> would become apparent quite quickly (by comparing historical voting 
    >> records).  In addition, tampering with ballots themselves would be 
    >> pretty apparent, and quite time consuming for the individual 
    >> hypothetical partisan carriers. 
    >
    >
    > You don't have to tamper with the ballots, just lose them on a 
    > district-by-district basis for heavily biased districts.
    >
    > Toning it down a bit: IMHO, digital voting from the likes of Diebold 
    > is a MUCH greater threat to the legitimacy of democracy in America 
    > than vote-by-mail. Vote-by-mail is vulnerable to small-scale fraud 
    > that has to be done on a distributed grass-roots level to be 
    > effective. Digital voting can be completely and surrepticiously 
    > corrupted by a voting machine vendor who favors one party.
    >
    > Crispin
    >
    >
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Thu Sep 11 2003 - 16:56:23 PDT