Re: CRIME FW: @Stake pulls pin on Geer: Effect on research and pu blication (fwd)

From: Crispin Cowan (crispin@private)
Date: Tue Oct 07 2003 - 12:31:41 PDT

  • Next message: Crispin Cowan: "Re: CRIME FW: @Stake pulls pin on Geer: Effect on research and pu blication (fwd)"

    Zot O'Connor wrote:
    
    >On Tue, 2003-10-07 at 09:26, John McHugh wrote:
    >  
    >
    >>Among other things, this seeks ways to create large numbers of variants 
    >>of functionally equivalent programs.  Suppose that there were 1000 
    >>different versions of, say, IIS, each requiring a different buffer 
    >>overflow exploit, but appearing identical in function and performance 
    >>to the user.  Now, the developer of a new exploit must develop the 1000 
    >>variations and launch them simultaneously.  In addition, each variant 
    >>will have a 1000 times more difficult task in propagating.
    >>    
    >>
    >I have often wondered about this approach.  It is sort like the canary
    >from StackGuard (CFIAPM) combined with the "roll your own" philosophy of
    >some Linux folks.  By placing randomness throughout the build process
    >you might mitigate the impact of the overflows, though I am not sure to
    >what extent the randomness would have to be.  While shifting code around
    >would disturb the pattern, it is unlikely to remove the overflow.
    >
    This paper is my general view on the relative effectiveness of 
    randomization for diversity's sake:
    
        "The Cracker Patch Choice: An Analysis of Post Hoc Security
        Techniques".  Crispin Cowan, Heather Hinton, Calton Pu, and Jonathan
        Walpole.  Presented at the National Information Systems Security
        Conference (NISSC) <http://csrc.nist.gov/nissc/>, Baltimore MD,
        October 16-19 2000. PDF
        <http://immunix.com/%7Ecrispin/crackerpatch.pdf>.
    
    Basically, I spent 4 years trying to make the randomization effect work 
    for intrusion prevention, and in every case I found a more adroit hack 
    that worked better. This is where the Immunix tool suite came from.
    
    You can also read about it in this bugtraq thread 
    http://lists.insecure.org/lists/bugtraq/2003/Aug/index.html#329
    
    On the other hand, here is a surprisingly effective instance of address 
    space randomization, presented this week at the SRDS 
    <http://srds2003.cnuce.cnr.it/> conference:
    
        Jun Xu, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk and Ravishankar K. Iyer. Transparent
        Runtime Randomization for Security.
        <http://www.crhc.uiuc.edu/%7Ejunxu/Papers/SRDS2003_final_trr.pdf> To
        appear in /Proc. of 22nd Symposium on Reliable and Distributed
        Systems (SRDS)/, Florence, Italy, October 6-8, 2003.
    
    Crispin
    
    -- 
    Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.           http://immunix.com/~crispin/
    Chief Scientist, Immunix       http://immunix.com
                http://www.immunix.com/shop/
    



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