IR/Forensics issues, was => Re: Evidence Dynamics

From: H C (keydet89at_private)
Date: Mon Dec 03 2001 - 09:21:28 PST

  • Next message: Matt Pepe: "FW: Evidence Dynamics, was => Re: boobytraps"

    > Most sys admins trounce through the crime scene
    > as you described without realize the cost of their
    > actions on the evidence until it is too late.  
    
    Or at all.  One investigation I had was over before it
    started.  The sysadmin (in OH) reported he had
    received "a ton of" failed login attempts from a user
    (in FL).  This 'suspicious activity' was in actuality
    3 events spread across 2 print servers.  The admin
    admitted to me that he'd mapped the user's drive and
    began roaming around the file system w/ Explorer,
    looking at email, files, etc.  I got this all after
    the fact.  Oh, and the admin had was a former cop.  Go
    figure.
    
    > Sys admins are trained to keep
    > their systems running and configured properly, their
    > first thought is
    > not crime scene preservation as we all would like.  
    
    Agreed.  This is a training issue, but it is also a
    management issue.  It's a management issue b/c it's
    management's responsibility to see that the IT staff
    is trained, but it's also management's role to have
    say over how the IT staff spends their time.  Right
    now, many sites have under-trained and under-manned
    staffs trying to keep systems up.  If management
    allocated the appropriate resources, things would be
    different.
    
    Also, how many sites actually do employee performance
    reviews?  I mean, official reviews, conducted by
    management.  Not many that I've seen.  I think this
    would go a long way toward overall security, as well. 
    After all, if you sit an admin down, and tell him
    you're going to evaluate him on his performance...the
    contents of his reports regarding events recorded by
    the system, results of system scans for compliance w/
    policy, etc...and then you actually track these items,
    that admin would put some effort toward meeting those
    requirements, don't you think?
    
    > Monetary
    > losses are the best example of how time could be a
    > factor.  Especially
    > since most sys admins know that 99 percent of all
    > glitches are not crime related.  
    
    This is an excellent example.  Troubleshooting and
    incident response skills go hand in hand, particularly
    with mission-critical servers in which down time means
    lost money.  How much time would it take to make a
    bit-image copy of the drives (such servers would
    likely use multiple drives in a RAID 5, hot-swappable
    config)?  Now, with some investigation, some 'touching
    of the system', the admin could retrieve information
    that would allow management to make a sound decision
    regarding whether or not to take the system down.
    
    > The incident verification principals should be:
    > 
    > 1.  Avoid paralysis
    > 2.  It is OK to touch the system.  Even if
    > performing a methodical
    > search you will need to interact in some way. 
    > (doing nothing ALSO changes the system).
    
    Right.  As time passes, IP endpoints time out, network
    connections expire, intruders continue their
    activities, and users log out.  Inactivity and
    indecisiveness by an admin or manager could have an
    effect on the outcome of an investigation.
    
    >  Gather evidence, even in the
    > most time consuming
    > undisturbing way... changes the system.  Have
    > procedures and train to them.  
    
    That's the most important point.  Having a procedure
    or methodology is actually the easiest way to handle
    things.  Methodologies can be changed.  Having someone
    "pull it out of thin air" each time doesn't leave any
    room for modification.  Procedures, in accordance with
    policy, need to be determined ahead of time, and
    checklists and training included.
    
    > 3.  Document everything. If you know an action might
    > have an unknown
    > affect as many do, record it.  You can testify it
    > was you later on.
    > Also good to have a recorder watch you or video tape
    > your actions.
    
    Military officers know that documentation is king.  If
    you didn't document it, it didn't happen.  
     
    And again we come back to management...if management
    doesn't allocate the appropriate resources to ensure
    that there enough trained personnel on staff (notice
    that I haven't said that you have to have one or two
    people specifically dedicated to forensics ONLY...it's
    more like special forces, where everyone knows two or
    three jobs), with the appropriate equipment and
    direction, it will all break down.  
    
    
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