RE: Remote Syslogd

From: Gino Pietro Guidi (gguidiat_private)
Date: Mon Nov 04 2002 - 19:30:37 PST

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    I have recently came across an article that described secure logging
    using snort. Basically snort was configured to dump the contents of all
    syslog packets sent to a fake ip. Then that ip was set up as the loghost
    ip on the remote hosts. With this configuration, in theory, you wouldn't
    be able to hack into it provided the snort box had no ip's on ANY
    interface and simply listened. It was interesting but I haven't gotten
    around to trying it yet. It sounds pretty strong to me though. I think
    it was in Linux Journal that I read about it. I could probably find the
    reference if anyone is interested...
    
    Gino Guidi
    gguidiat_private
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Tom Perrine [mailto:tepat_private] 
    Sent: Friday, November 01, 2002 10:22 AM
    To: paulat_private
    Cc: msconzoat_private; forensicsat_private
    Subject: Re: Remote Syslogd
    
    >>>>> On 30 Oct 2002 11:18:04 -0500, Paul Timmins <paulat_private>
    said:
    
        PT> Another option I've employed at one point is to direct security
    logs to
        PT> /dev/lp0 and throw a dot matrix printer with a continuous feed
    of paper
        PT> on the parallel port (I did this on Linux, I'm sure it works on
    other
        PT> OSs).
        PT> Once they get into the machine, there's no way they can delete
    the logs.
        PT> I mean, they can move the paper back a line or two with the
    epson
        PT> control sequences and try to print over it, but combined with a
    remote
        PT> logging server, you have evidence that is likely alot easier to
    prove
        PT> wasn't tampered with (IANAL).
        PT> My $0.02.
        PT> -Paul
    
    We used to do that.  Way back when, e.g. 1994, we hooked up a
    DecWriter III (LA-120) to log all system logs that hit our loghost, to
    paper.  As the volume picked up, we started only logging the
    authentication stuff.  By 1996 or so, the volume was going through a
    box of fanfold or worse every shift.
    
    I've often wanted to build a box that did the functional equivalent
    with a CD-burner, e.g. burn log records to CD (or DVD?) in real time.
    
    -- 
    Tom E. Perrine <tepat_private> | San Diego Supercomputer Center 
    http://www.sdsc.edu/~tep/     | 
    
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