RE: CRC32 vd MD5

From: Ronald Prins (prins@fox-it.com)
Date: Sun Jan 05 2003 - 11:47:42 PST

  • Next message: Simson L. Garfinkel: "Re: CRC32 vd MD5"

    > 
    > In the following two pdf files:
    > 
    >http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/68089/0.pdf
    >http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/68092/0.pdf
    
    So you are reading Cryptome.org ?
    
    >related to the case of USA vs Zacarias Moussaoui, there is some 
    >discussion of the use
    >of CRC32 instead of MD5 to provide verification that a hard disk has
    been imaged 
    >correctly. In this particular case the later use of MD5 would seem to
    confirm the accurate 
    >imaging of the disks in question but in general does the use of CRC32
    during (and after) 
    >the imaging process really make any further checking with MD5
    redundant?
    
    I did not read the case papers yet, so my answering may not be in the
    right context of this case. 
    
    In my experience a lot of "forensic investigators" are using hashing
    mechanisms in a wrong way. A disadvantage of digital evidence is that is
    very easy to manipulate with. To detect if this has happened one can use
    hashing functions. But calculating a hash while imaging, writing this
    down, and two months later showing that the hash hasn't changed proves
    totally nothing. If the hash has not been given to a trusted third party
    (or timestamping/signing service) manipulating the digital evidence is
    as hard as filling out a new form with the new hashvalue.
    
    In the first PDF you mentioned, I found this paragraph:
    ---
    11. There are a number of commonly accepted hash formulae and methods of
    "running" hashes in the computer forensic community, including the
    following: the Cyclical Redundancy Checksum (CRC), the Secure Hash
    Algorithm Version 1 (SHA-1), and the Message Digest Sum, Version 5
    (MD5). Currently, CART techniques incorporate CRC and md5sum hashing
    methods.
    ---
    In my opinion CRC, SHA-1 and MD5 should not be referred to as one and
    the same type of hasing. For error detecting CRC codes are fine. To make
    sure disks haven't been manipulated with, only real cryptographic one
    way hash functions should be used. 
    
    >Furthermore, would it be realistically possible to change data in an 
    >image whose
    >authenticity is based solely on CRC32 value(s) without changing the
    values in question, 
    >and thereby arousing suspicion?
    
    Yes, this is actually quite easy. Not only because the "hash-value" is
    too short, but CRC32 algorithm was not designed as a one-way hash. MD5
    (and SHA-1) have the special property that is not possible to generate a
    text given a hash-value.
    
    To make a text for a given CRC32:
    
    1. write the text you want to match this CRC
    2. in this text find 32 words you can find a replacement for which does
    not change the meaning (eg. I love Holland / I love the Netherlands) 3.
    write a program that will brute force thru all the 2^32 different texts
    with same meaning to find one which will give you a match 4. run the
    program :)
    
    Let's make this a long thread,
    
    
    Ronald.
    
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