Re: how to do intrusion detection right

From: Sheila Or Bob (depends on who is writing) (shsrmsat_private)
Date: Sat Apr 18 1998 - 06:29:29 PDT

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    Nicholas Charles Brawn wrote:
    > 
    > Would you then not run the risk of attackers masking hostile traffic by
    > making it appear to look "expected"?
    > 
    > Nicholas Brawn
    
    Exactly!  The gabriel and other scan detectors are easily defeated by a
    patient low level attack - spread things over a time period that is
    beyond their threshhold, do things aperiodically.
    Sometimes humans can discern something is out of the ordinary. 
    Sometimes they can't.
    
    In the event of establishing a profile of the net "what is normal
    traffic" with a new IDS, they can be confused with what I call white
    noise.  so that things look like they are expected! 
    bob
    
    > 
    > --
    > Email: ncb05at_private
    > Nicholas Brawn - Computer Science Undergraduate, University of Wollongong.
    > 
    > On Thu, 16 Apr 1998, George J. Dolicker wrote:
    > 
    > > I think perhaps what the intrusion detection system might do is not look
    > > for something "interesting", but rather something "different".  Rather than
    > > trying to define what is a problem, define what is NOT a problem... so
    > > configure the IDS to smile upon traffic that is expected, and panic over
    > > anything else.
    > >
    > > Same principal we use in firewalling:  that which is not explictly
    > > permitted is denied.
    > >
    > > G.
    > >
    > > At 12:02 PM 4/16/98 MDT, Martin W Freiss wrote:
    > > >When the administrator can tailor the IDS to unacceptable/interesting
    > > >stuff on the net, what he does is transfer his own mindset about security
    > > >to the IDS. I then have a machine that "thinks" like me, which thus alerts
    > > >me about facts that I am already aware of - a useful thing that may save
    > > >some work, but will not help me notice next week's bug being exploited.
    > > >
    > > >I may be stupid, but what is "interesting" is something I do not know
    > > >before an intrusion attempt.
    > > >Tomorrow's attack may use some technique that is "obviously" safe today,
    > > >thus bypassing my (human or computer) filtering layer. Using a sufficiently
    > > >"new" technique, my firewall will probably not notice that it has been
    > > >broached. What _can_ help me is having a complete log of everything that
    > > >has been going through the network, which I can then analyze to understand
    > > >what has happened. An intrusion analysis system, if you will - which
    > > >so far includes a large human component.
    > > >
    > > >-Martin
    > > >
    > >
    > >
    
    -- 
    real address is shsrms at erols dot com
    The Herbal Gypsy and the Tinker.
    



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