Re: [fw-wiz] Tunnel intruder

From: John Adams (jna-dated-1034639771.19b374at_private)
Date: Wed Oct 09 2002 - 16:56:08 PDT

  • Next message: R. DuFresne: "RE: [fw-wiz] Tunnel intruder"

    On Wed, 9 Oct 2002, Jim MacLeod wrote:
    
    > There's a lot of FUD being touted by firewall vendors about the possibility 
    > of a home computer being hacked, then the attacker using that computer's 
    > VPN connection to the office to break into the company network.
    
    If you disable split-tunnelling, this isn't much of an issue. There's a 
    far greater fear of the user picking up a virus on the public Internet and 
    then connecting to your company through VPN. The virus could work it's way 
    into your internal network causing all sorts of grief.
    
    Without a split-tunnel, though, you create a major issue for people using
    local printers (on their home networks) and in branch offices; suddently
    they can't access anything local and are forced to used enterprise-wide 
    services. 
    
    There's also the issue of lag -- if the VPN server is in LA, and your
    users are in Boston, but there's a network connection back to the local
    corporate network in Boston, users who use services from your Boston-Based
    hosts are quite lagged when they go home and VPN-in for the night. 
    (Installing a server in Boston fixes this, though!) 
    
    Some or all of these issues may cause things to fail in your 
    environment. 
    
    > I can see this as a possibility and realize that we could easily get into 
    > an extended discussion of the probability/impossibility/inevitability of it 
    > occurring.  I personally want to avoid speculation.
    > 
    > Does anybody know of an actual incident where this attack was used, 
    > successfully or not?
    
    With split-tunneling turned on, though, it's possible for someone to 
    attack the employee's machine and use that machine as a stepping stone to 
    greater access. 
    
    In the wild, I have seen probes come from people's home Linux machines
    (while using a split-tunneled Cisco VPN client) when their home machine
    has been penetrated and the user has left the machine logged in. 
    
    This mode of attack can happen and (although rare) I do feel that it's no
    longer a speculative issue. 
    
    Why take the chance? Don't enable split-tunneling.
    
    -john
    
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