RE: Possible method to prevent spread of CodeRed and other simila r wo rms

From: McCammon, Keith (Keith.McCammonat_private)
Date: Wed Aug 01 2001 - 11:33:50 PDT

  • Next message: Ralph Gervolino: "RE: code red scans"

    Dave,
    
    This is a great idea.  Funny thing is that just about any responsible
    network engineer already does this with a firewall or access list:
    
    INBOUND
    access-list 112 permit tcp any gt 1023 host X.X.X.X eq 80
    access-list 112 permit tcp any gt 1023 host X.X.X.X eq 443
    
    OUTBOUND
    access-list 113 permit tcp host X.X.X.X eq 80 any established
    access-list 113 permit tcp host X.X.X.X eq 443 any established
    
    The problem we have, you see, is that there seems to be a *ridiculous* lack
    of responsible network/systems/security engineers, as evidenced by this
    silly-a** worm.
    
    Cheers!
    
    Keith
    
    
    >-----Original Message-----
    >From: dave.goldsmithat_private [mailto:dave.goldsmithat_private]
    >Sent: Wednesday, August 01, 2001 1:48 PM
    >To: incidentsat_private
    >Subject: Possible method to prevent spread of CodeRed and other similar
    >wo rms
    >
    >
    >I mailed this earlier today but got a message that the 
    >incidents mailbox was
    >disabled so I am resending it.
    >
    >Obviously firewalls, screening routers and whatever other 
    >tools people use
    >to guard their networks are configured to allow INCOMING 
    >connections from
    >the Internet to be initiated to their public web servers.  The 
    >web server
    >then responds and while the session exists, two way traffic is 
    >exchanged.
    >
    >Is there normally any reason for a web server to initiate OUTBOUND
    >connections to the Internet?  If not, why not block such 
    >outbound packets?
    >The primary reason that I can think of for a web server to 
    >initiate Internet
    >traffic is if a system administrator is upgrading software and 
    >trying to
    >retrieve software patches from the Internet.  Usually, you could access
    >those files from a local network server or transfer the files 
    >via flopy/CD
    >or other media.
    >
    >If an IIS (or any other) web server were to become infected 
    >with a worm that
    >then tried to spread, that system would be blocked from 
    >sending out viral
    >traffic.
    >
    >Flaws, glaring omissions, or a good idea?
    >
    >Dave Goldsmith
    >
    >
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