Cody, I understand that you didn't get to do a forensics analysis of the system, but did you get a chance to actually look at the fport output? Also, when you say that lb.exe hid the processes from "all monitoring agents", what are you referring to? Did you get to see any of the output of any tools? If so, do you still have copies? Do you have any idea in Russia where this "lb.exe" came from? Is there anything in the snort or IIS logs that points to the site? Do you still have a copy of the FTP script file used? > Yeah, sorry, I meant Task Manager. I unfortunately I > don't have a copy > of lb.exe, although it was impressive. It did a > great job of hiding all > of the processes from all monitoring agents. The > only reason the person > knew they had it was they had Snort running. It > caught and logged the > Unicode attack. They were running IIS 5.0 on a > Win2000 machine, too. > Netstat didn't show the open port connecting to the > IRC channel, and > neither did fport. There was even a GUI menu that > showed which processes > were hidden and which one's weren't. You could > choose which things to > hide, and which ones to let show. All of the normal > methods of gathering > system info were on the menu. I didn't get to make a > complete forensic > examination because the user of the box had messed > around with things > before I got there. __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Health - your guide to health and wellness http://health.yahoo.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS analyzer service. For more information on this free incident handling, management and tracking system please see: http://aris.securityfocus.com
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri May 03 2002 - 08:36:43 PDT