Re: Worm on 445/tcp?

From: Tom.Gastat_private
Date: Tue Dec 17 2002 - 11:52:55 PST

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    I don't believe Windows XP is going to be effected by this worm, due to 
    the fact null is disabled by default.
    
    - - Tom G.
    
    
    
    
    Scott Fendley <scottfat_private>
    12/17/2002 11:24 AM
    
     
            To:     "Scott A.McIntyre" <scottat_private>, incidentsat_private
            cc: 
            Subject:        Re: Worm on 445/tcp?
    
    
    
    
    I think what you are seeing is the newest worm to come out called LIOTEN 
    or 
    Iraqi Oil worm.  It appears that it is only infecting windows 2k/XP 
    servers 
    via SMB connections.  There appears to be a lot of details amongst the 
    following URLs which can do a better job describing this worm then I 
    could.  --Scott
    
    
    http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.hllw.lioten.html
    http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/virusencyclo/default5.asp?VName=WORM_LIOTEN.A
    http://vil.mcafee.com/dispVirus.asp?virus_k=99897
    http://www.mynetwatchman.com/kb/security/articles/iraqiworm/index.htm
    http://www.unixwiz.net/iraqworm/
    
    At 08:56 AM 12/17/2002 +0100, Scott A.McIntyre wrote:
    >Over the past two weeks or so I've been noticing a steady rise in what 
    >appears to be worm related traffic to the new unified smb over tcp port 
    >(445) on Microsoft Win2k and newer operating systems.
    >
    >I haven't yet been able to properly identify what the culprit is; at 
    first 
    >I thought a variation of OpaServ, and that hasn't been fully ruled out, 
    >but I'm not quite convinced of that either.  Anyone have any clues that 
    >might help pin this down further?
    >
    >An infected machine seems to send the following:
    >
    >1095 114.002629 src -> dst  SMB Negotiate Protocol Request
    >1105 114.363458 src -> dst  SMB Session Setup AndX Request
    >1106 114.774364 src -> dst  SMB Session Setup AndX Request
    >1107 115.168792 src -> dst  SMB Tree Connect AndX Request,Path: 
    \\dst\IPC$
    >1110 115.330792 src -> dst  SMB NT Create AndX Request, Path: \samr
    >1112 115.652261 src -> dst  DCERPC Bind: call_id: 1 UUID: SAMR
    >1136 117.759036 src -> dst  SAMR Connect4 request
    >1137 118.299350 src -> dst  SMB Close Request, FID: 0x4000
    >1142 119.004483 src -> dst  SMB Logoff AndX Request
    >1150 119.375665 src -> dst  SMB Tree Disconnect Request
    >
    >And another:
    >
    >7.933416 src -> dst SMB Negotiate Protocol Request
    >10.958481 src -> dst SMB Session Setup AndX Request
    >13.654558 src -> dst SMB Tree Connect AndX Request, Path: \\dst\IPC$
    >13.926353 src -> dst SMB NT Create AndX Request, Path: \samr
    >15.231252 src -> dst DCERPC Bind: call_id: 1 UUID: SAMR
    >17.149345 src -> dst SAMR Connect4 request
    >20.405997 src -> dst SAMR EnumDomains request
    >23.579240 src -> dst SAMR LookupDomain request
    >25.341903 src -> dst SAMR OpenDomain request
    >25.891947 src -> dst SAMR EnumDomainUsers request
    >26.597393 src -> dst SAMR Close request
    >29.615040 src -> dst SMB Close Request, FID: 0x4000
    >30.048894 src -> dst SMB Logoff AndX Request
    >32.738878 src -> dst SMB Tree Disconnect Request
    >
    >
    >It appears as though there's a high degree of randomness to the 
    >destination IP addresses that are chosen by the worm as can be seen from 
    >this 1 second snapshot:
    >
    >
    >     121.33.1.48
    >   91.71.109.105
    >    76.123.46.27
    >   222.120.99.35
    >    124.72.254.8
    >   17.64.153.118
    >    27.23.33.121
    >   185.33.178.38
    >   151.49.213.31
    >   167.60.15.125
    >   132.86.243.68
    >   26.125.133.71
    >    1.104.130.21
    >    40.88.91.120
    >   48.101.140.21
    >     48.93.34.36
    >   193.60.220.48
    >    117.26.58.96
    >     27.2.15.114
    >     25.7.221.31
    >
    >
    >Note: the infected system's ip address is not within any of these network 
    
    >segments.
    >
    >I've noticed others reporting similar increase in traffic, but so far 
    >haven't seen a definitive acknowledgment of precisely what it is that's 
    >responsible.
    >
    >Any pointers gratefully accepted.
    >
    >
    >
    >
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    ---
    Scott Fendley                           scottfat_private
    Systems/Security Analyst                (479) 575-2022
    University of Arkansas                  (479) 575-4753 fax
    
    
    
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