ideas on interface (was Be careful please)

From: Chris Wright (chrisat_private)
Date: Fri Apr 13 2001 - 18:09:32 PDT

  • Next message: David Wagner: "Re: The bootstrap process"

    * Wagner, Grant (gmwat_private) wrote:
    <snip>
    > 
    > I know it is more fun to run off and implement a quick and dirty example but
    > aren't we jumping the gun?  I don't think  Linux needs a quick and dirty
    > security solution. I believe that if we want to actually respond to Linus's
    > charge, we need to spend a short time looking at the various approaches and
    > then agree on a practical, maximally inclusive approach. After all, if Linus
    > simply wanted something not too bad that he could slap into the kernel now,
    > he would have chosen one of the existing prototypes. I believe that he
    > expects us to come up with a thoughtful design that offers a platform for
    > strong security built upon the lessons learned from the existing approaches.
    
    Thanks Grant, this is well put.  I might add that this is an iterative
    process, and some of the early hacking/prototyping is useful in grasping
    the issues.  So far we have all implemented things in our own way
    according to our own needs.  So now we try to collect our needs and
    develop an appropriately abstracted interface.  We have been given some
    _real_ clues about what Linus will accept, makes sense to follow these ;-)
    
    Linus has suggested an interface geared towards kernel objects, others
    would prefer to interpose at the syscall interface.  Porting capabilities
    to the interface must be supported, and is a great candidate for the
    trial run (this is what we are working on right now).  So...how?
    Capabilites defines some level of abstraction (just take a look at
    linux/capability.h to see how funcitonality is grouped).  But it also
    blends interposition ;-(
    
    We are in favor of the interface conforming to the concept of
    protecting kernel objects. whenever possible.  So for example, CAP_SETGID,
    CAP_SETUID, CAP_NICE all basically interpose at syscall level.  However,
    these are really just protecting data in the task structure.  
    
    See attached "header" file for a rough sketch of an interface that
    we'd like to propose/discuss.  (NOTE: this is not compilable code,
    simply a way to discuss _how_ to abstract the interface).
    
    -chris
    
    
    

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