Stephen Smalley wrote: > > On Mon, 4 Jun 2001, Titus D. Winters wrote: > > > 1. Political difficulties should not be considered in the design of > > software. ... > > I don't understand this argument. I don't mind flamewars, but LSM > is worthless to us if it is not accepted into the Linux kernel. So > we have to consider how acceptable our solution will be to the Linux > kernel developers. You can't compromise the product to make the sale. In software management jargon your approach is called "bid to win", the notion being that you only ask for what you think you can get. Ever wonder why so many software products fall short of the mark? > Where's the real argument for moving all of the base logic out of > the kernel? Identify exactly what project needs it, and why it > can't be supported adequately through separate hooks (including > the capable hook for permissive behavior). Err, it was on the selinux list. Someone wants a policy which modifies the DAC policy under certain MAC conditions. It was something on the order of "users cleared for TS can read UNCLASS data regardless of the file permissions." You can't do that if the traditional DAC checks are done outside the policy module. -- Casey Schaufler Manager, Trust Technology, SGI caseyat_private voice: 650.933.1634 casey_pat_private Pager: 888.220.0607 _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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