Re: Assurance, permissiveness, and restriction

From: Stephen Smalley (sdsat_private)
Date: Mon Jun 04 2001 - 12:25:21 PDT

  • Next message: Stephen Smalley: "Re: Assurance, permissiveness, and restriction"

    On Mon, 4 Jun 2001 sarnoldat_private wrote:
    
    > A quick check of my version of the source code shows that we only have
    > opaque security blobs on the binprm or binfmts stuff. Shouldn't there
    > be more opaque blobs placed on objects (dentries in this case? Or
    > would inodes be preferred? Both?) to allow just this sort of policy
    > easily?
    
    LSM has security blobs on inodes already, but that isn't
    the problem.  The LSM permission hook has access to the
    inode, but it doesn't have any way to override a denial
    by the base logic (it only has a way to override a granting by 
    the base logic).  The capable() function and its LSM hook
    don't have access to the inode, since capabilities are
    merely process privileges, so the CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
    check cannot be performed based on the file's attributes.
    
    --
    Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
    ssmalleyat_private
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
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