Re: Assurance, permissiveness, and restriction

From: Chris Wright (chrisat_private)
Date: Mon Jun 04 2001 - 18:49:35 PDT

  • Next message: Chris Wright: "Re: sys_setpriority error"

    * Stephen Smalley (sdsat_private) wrote:
    > 
    > On Mon, 4 Jun 2001, Casey Schaufler wrote:
    > 
    > > I guess that's my point. Sure, you can kludge it up
    > > so that it sorta works the way you'd like in this case,
    > > but it sure ain't generally useful.
    > 
    > I'm merely limited by the existing capable() interface,
    > which doesn't pass object information for relevant objects.
    > Of course, we could propose extending the capable() interface
    > (thereby allowing our capable hook to also pass object
    > information, thereby allowing our modules to implement
    > the kind of functionality I would like).  But that seems
    > like something that should be pursued separately and
    > not something that we should depend on for LSM.
    
    In a sense that's the direction of the current code.  Many
    calls to capable are replaced with hooks that provide modules with
    relevant object information.  We've already discussed the pros/cons of a
    generic hook interface, I'm not confident we could come up with a nice
    looking extension to the capable interface without splitting it up into
    calls like cap_fowner() instead of capable(CAP_FOWNER).  But even with
    this, you get the heinous offender, CAP_SYS_ADMIN which is the catch all
    and I think the interface would require a bunch of void pointers.
    
    I think if we want to consider supporting permissive policies, we should
    plan for it right now.
    
    -chris
    
    
    
    _______________________________________________
    linux-security-module mailing list
    linux-security-moduleat_private
    http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Mon Jun 04 2001 - 18:53:21 PDT