Re: LSM Patch Additions for CAPP (C2) Audit Trails

From: Crispin Cowan (crispinat_private)
Date: Thu Jul 05 2001 - 23:57:19 PDT

  • Next message: Stephen Smalley: "Re: Kernel Security Extensions USENIX BOF Summary"

    jmjonesat_private wrote:
    
    > Can anybody state (succinctly) the limits of LSM, yet?
    
    Based on a lunch meeting with Ted Ts'o at USENIX, the scoping guideline is:
    
       * Now: sufficient hooks to support access controls.
       * Later:  try to pitch the mainline kernel group on audit hooks
    
    This 2-stage approach is recomended so as to maximize our chances of making
    any progress at all.
    
    Naturally, any other kind of module that can make do with the hooks LSM
    provides is welcome to do so, but the guidance is that throwing in lots more
    hooks than are needed by access controls endangers the acceptability of LSM.
    
    At the same lunch, we briefed Ted on the discussion of how to deal with the
    "capabilities question": should it be a module or not?  Should we move all
    kernel security logic out to a module or not?  Ted agreed with the consensus
    the LSM list came to a few weeks ago:  movking kernel logic out to a module
    is too intrusive and too risk-prone, so don't do it.
    
    Crispin
    
    --
    Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.
    Chief Scientist, WireX Communications, Inc. http://wirex.com
    Security Hardened Linux Distribution:       http://immunix.org
    Available for purchase: http://wirex.com/Products/Immunix/purchase.html
    
    
    _______________________________________________
    linux-security-module mailing list
    linux-security-moduleat_private
    http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Thu Jul 05 2001 - 23:58:22 PDT