Security Gurus, Okay, I admit I haven't actually downloaded any LSM kernel patches. And I wasn't at the BOF. In fact, I've only ever submitted a single (one line!) patch to the kernel. So my concerns may be totally unfounded.... Nevertheless, I consider one of the biggest problems with Unix security that root permission is required by network daemons. Consider: NTP - bind(), settimeofday()/adjtime() FTP/DNS - bind(), possibly chroot() and setuid() SMTP/POP/IMAP - bind(), read/write user's mail folders SSH - bind(), setuid() DHCP - bind() (and promiscous mode?) HTTP/IRC/syslog - bind() Now in some cases the application can setuid() to a non-root user, but not always (NTP, non-anonymous FTP, SMTP/POP/IMAP). In the most other cases, the application can drop capabilities, but this is not always true (for SSH at least). This does make having applications reset on SIGHUP difficult sometimes. More importantly, it violates the goal of assigning the least amount of privilege necessary to accomplish a specific task. I've seen it said over and over on this list: security is hard and often programmers get it wrong simply because they're not security experts. I agree! I've touched on this before, but I figure I may as well keep trying until I get an answer: Is it possible to create an LSM with the current proposed model that will allow me to grant only a small subset of root privileges to a specific executable? If not, is there another way to go about this (perhaps by using other hooks and dropping privileges for the processes - i.e. when exec() runs "ntpd" drop all privileges except for bind() and adjtime(), and when that process calls bind() drop that privilege - yuck)? In my mind, this is "permissive", and folks don't want to do that. I think that may be a mistake - does that make any sense? Nervously yours, Shane _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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