Re: Security through Permissiveness: A Zen Riddle?

gregat_private

On Fri, Jul 13, 2001 at 04:59:59PM -0400, jmjonesat_private wrote:
> On Fri, 13 Jul 2001, Greg KH wrote:
> 
> > Both of those would kill the acceptance of the patch.
> 
> A statement of opinion, unless you or somebody has already hashed it out
> with the Kernel Developers.

A complete statement of opinion.

How I have come to have that opinion:
    Both of those reasons are reasons patches have been rejected from
    the kernel in the past.  My own included.  Both of these reasons are
    public knowledge if you read the kernel mailing lists and talk to
    the developers themselves.

    Hell, I've rejected patches from people for those very reasons for
    the small portion of the kernel that I am a maintainer for :)

So my opinion is based on personal experience and public knowledge,
which can be researched.

And you base your opinion on?  :)

> My proposal doesn't prevent this.  It simply changes the security_ops 
> structure minimally to address other needs.

If it isn't needed today, don't have code that has it in it today.
That's one of the kernel source rules.

Unless we are talking about reserved fields in data structures that _can
not change_ over time.  Like those in a filesystem, or those that
interact with userspace.  Our data structures are neither.  Hence, we
can change them over time as modules come to need them, _after_ we get
the current stuff finished and accepted.

greg k-h

_______________________________________________
linux-security-module mailing list
linux-security-moduleat_private
http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module