On Tue, 24 Jul 2001, Wayne Salamon wrote: > fs/ioctl.c:sys_ioctl() calls the file_ops->ioct() hook, and every > ioctl therefore gets intercepted. So, you can control ioctl access > to all objects via this single call, I believe. However, you do > set up potential race conditions where the user-space parameter > is copied in the file_ops->ioctl() to check access, but then > is later copied and checked again at the lower level. A multithreaded > process could modify the ioctl()'s arg parameter between those two > checks. > Indeed! So, this means that we can't have ioctl() hooks that need to validate user data anywhere other than the point where the user data is normally copied from userspace. - James -- James Morris <jmorrisat_private> _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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