We've been over this before, but to summaraize and concentrate the discussions into hopefully a mutually dissapointing conclusion, here goes. There are two projects (SubDomain, our B1 code) that have mutually conflicting requirements. SubDomain has a policy that allows normal DAC checks to procede and then enforces MAC checks if it gets that far. For its policy (I think of it as containing), this makes perfect sense. B1 want to perform the MAC check first, if that is acceptable, then the normal DAC checks can procede. Partly this is audit driven (if a check would return a MAC fail, it should, not a DAC fail) partly customer expectation. Possible Solutions ================== Implement DAC before MAC Pro: No code changes, SubDomain is happy Con: SGI unhappy, fails litmus test of supporting all reasonable policies Implement MAC before DAC Pro: SGI happy, Con: SubDomain unhappy, extra work, fails litmus test of supporting all reasonable policies Hooks pre and post DAC logic Pro: Works for both camps Con: People belive it wont pass muster by the kernel list. Single Hook to replace all DAC logic Pro: Works for both camps Con: Means moving DAC logic out of the kernel into the module, People belive it wont pass muster by the kernel list, extra work. Build time selection of hook placement #ifdef MAC_BEFORE_DAC security_ops->hook() #endif /* in-line DAC logic */ #ifndef MAC_BEFORE_DAC security_ops->hook() #endif Pro: works for both camps Con: REALLY ugly, #ifdefs, possibly limits policies that could be loaded. Those are the only options I can see, anyone any others ? richard. _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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