jmjonesat_private wrote: > >CERT.ORG has just notified we-last-notified of a ptrace problem. >If there's anyplace in the current kernel code that LSM should make NO >logic changes, right now, it's there. > >Preserve the logic, please, and watch how the kernel community fixes/fixed >it. > Corrollary: it would be really nice if LSM facilitated ptrace-protection modules. Solar Designer has proposed a really good sounding security enhancement: disable ptrace for setuid root programs. Rationalle: * ptrace is only used rarely, and for the most part people wouldn't notice if it were crippled. * However, ptrace is really useful from time to time, so we don't want to just remove it. * ptrace exploitation almost always involves an attacker with a local shell messing around with ptrace on a setuid root binary. So cripple that. Now, the LSM rationalle: Linus may not like the above hack. Like most of Solar's other innovations, it addresses a user-space problem in kernel space, and Linus doesn't like that. But if LSM had hooks that could do the above, people who wanted such a ptrace prophalactic could have one. Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. Chief Scientist, WireX Communications, Inc. http://wirex.com Security Hardened Linux Distribution: http://immunix.org Available for purchase: http://wirex.com/Products/Immunix/purchase.html _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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