On Thu, 25 Oct 2001, richard offer wrote: > With no subsequent discussion following posting of the last patch (which > incorporated changes to meet Chris's suggestions) all the issues appear to > have been put to bed so there should be no reason for not moving forward > with this. And now, for a non-technical comment, when the LSM patch is submitted to the kernel developers for consideration into 2.5, we will need to be able to provide evidence that the changes made by LSM are needed by real security modules. I would expect even greater need for concrete justification for the kinds of changes made by the authoritative hooks patch, since it is more invasive and increases the likelihood that a security module may accidentally open a vulnerability in the base logic. For the current LSM patch, we have concrete open source examples such as the capabilities module, the SELinux module and the DTE module (and more underway by the IBM folks, right?). For authoritative hooks, we currently have nothing. And I don't think a trivial example module would be helpful - we need a real security module that is open source that demonstrates the need for these additional changes. I don't think that the kernel developers will be swayed by hand waving about unreleased or closed source security modules. -- Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs ssmalleyat_private _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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