On Thu, 11 Jul 2002, Wayne Salamon wrote: > On Thu, 11 Jul 2002, James Morris wrote: > > > > > What about utilizing the zero_it argument to sk_alloc(), so that > > sk_alloc_security() is not called if its value is zero. The only time > > this is zero is during the allocation of the new sk in > > tcp_create_openreq_child(), and in this case, an sk security field can > > then be allocated explicitly during the new hook call. For SELinux, this > > would be caught by extsocket_sock_precondition() in any case, right? > > > > I have a concern with this approach. If we have the > tcp_create_openreq_child() hook assume that there is no security structure > on the sock, if the kernel logic ever changes to use zero_it from the > tcp_create_openreq_child() function, we will leak memory. Yep, agreed that this approach is flawed, as Stephen also pointed out. > > Also, what about > IPV6? It looks like the sock is zero'd by sk_alloc then the fields are > set. Are we going to support IPV6 in LSM? > We could, but it may be better to wait until somebody needs it. - James -- James Morris <jmorrisat_private> _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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