Re: [RFC] No more module_* hooks

Previous message: Greg KH: "Re: Early initialization of security modules"
In reply to: Greg KH: "Re: [RFC] No more module_* hooks"
Next in thread: Greg KH: "Re: [RFC] No more module_* hooks"
Next in thread: James Morris: "Re: [RFC] No more module_* hooks"
Reply: Greg KH: "Re: [RFC] No more module_* hooks"
Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

chrisat_private

* Greg KH (gregat_private) wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 30, 2002 at 12:52:07AM -0700, Chris Wright wrote:
> > * Stephen Smalley (sdsat_private) wrote:
> > > 
> > > All of the hooks in the 2.5.38-lsm-ipc.patch are used by SELinux.  Of the
> > > hooks in the 2.5.38-lsm-misc.patch, the following hooks appear to be
> > > unused by the existing security modules:
> > > 	sethostname
> > > 	setdomainname
> > > 	reboot
> > > 	ioperm
> > > 	iopl
> > > 	module_*
> > 
> > All of the above hooks are used by SubDomain.
> 
> Is subdomain going to be released under the GPL anytime soon?

I hope so, yes.

> And is there any reason you can't use the capabilities check for these
> hooks, like SELinux does?  From what I remember, SubDomain didn't check
> these hooks in the past with any finer-grained access rights from what
> capabilities would give you, or am I forgetting things?

This is certainly true for reboot, and nearly true for module_*.  However,
set*name is simply using CAP_SYS_ADMIN...I think the change should go
the other way.  For example, it's simple to do:

cap_sethostname(...) { return cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); }

thanks,
-chris
-- 
Linux Security Modules     http://lsm.immunix.org     http://lsm.bkbits.net
_______________________________________________
linux-security-module mailing list
linux-security-moduleat_private
http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module