Re: [BK PATCH] LSM changes for 2.5.59

From: Stephen D. Smalley (sdsat_private)
Date: Wed Feb 05 2003 - 08:47:05 PST

  • Next message: Stephen D. Smalley: "Re: [BK PATCH] LSM changes for 2.5.59"

    Christoph Hellwig wrote:
    > Yes, and exactly that's the whole point of it!  The problem with LSM
    > is that it tries to be overly flexible and thus adds random hooks that
    > expose internal details all over the place.  Just stop that silly no policy
    > approach and life will get a lot simpler.  There's no reason to implement
    > everything and a kitchen sink in LSM.
    
    The sysctl hook simply provides a way for a security module to
    implement a security check for access to sysctl variables.  It provides
    a classic kernel object (ctl_table) x operation interface, with the
    subject implicitly passed via current, just like permission() for
    inodes.  A security module can leave the hook unimplemented (no
    restrictions beyond DAC), or implement a purely process-based
    restriction or implement fine-grained controls to individual sysctls.
    Sysctls are already exposed to userspace via sysctl(2) and/or
    /proc/sys, so I'm not sure what the concern is there.  Nothing
    complicated here.
    
    As to your argument about LSM's flexibility, LSM simply followed the
    guidance on what would be accepted into 2.5.  The original
    SELinux/Flask architecture was more tightly integrated and had
    well-defined boundaries while still providing substantial flexibility,
    but the response to the SELinux presentation was to move towards
    something more like LSM.  Seems pointless to argue about it now, except
    as suggestions for future directions for LSM in 2.7.
    
    > If you need attributes attached to the sysctl nodes just diable sysctl by
    > number and use the existing filesystem based hooks.
    
    Sorry, I don't see why this is preferable to implementing a single
    security hook in ctl_perm that is invoked for both sysctl(2) and
    /proc/sys access, providing a consistent access control regardless of
    the interface.  Your approach is more prone to vulnerability (failing to
    disable the sysctl(2) interface), and breaking application compatibility.
    
    --
    Stephen Smalley, NSA
    sdsat_private
    
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