On Tue, 2005-06-28 at 21:35 -0500, serue@private wrote: > Regarding whether to use capability or cap_stack, I think we do want to > protect the security.* extended attributes when no modules are loaded. > One might argue it's pretty much meaningless so long as you've booted > your non-selinux or non-mls kernel, but that's assuming to know too much > about someone's environment. What does everyone prefer? Protecting the security EAs against non-root manipulation by default. The same discussion previously occurred on lkml, when Chris posted the patch adding the cap_inode_setxattr/removexattr hooks in response to the original request by SuSE, see http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=107428839320842&w=2 -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency
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