Re[2]: [logs] Due Diligence for Admission in Court

From: Richard Welty (rweltyat_private)
Date: Fri Dec 07 2001 - 08:48:40 PST

  • Next message: todd glassey: "Re: [logs] Due Diligence for Admission in Court"

    On 07 Dec 2001 10:16:36 +0000 Dan Rowles <daniel.rowlesat_private> wrote:
    
    > Hmmm.... I can think of a few real world situations where you would want
    > users to have access to a box, but would also want to ensure that the
    > logs were reliable. 
    > 
    > But my real point I suppose is that authenticity is an important
    > requirement for logs. If my log files say that my http server, dns
    > server, mail server said "x", I want to know that message "x" really
    > *did* come from the daemon in question, and not, for example, from a
    > hacker / malicious user.
    > 
    > How you would implement this, though......
    
    the problem is very hard, because there are numerous potential points where
    security can be compromised.
    
    even if we can guarantee that the messages are from the box in question,
    can we guarantee that the box itself hasn't been compromised?
    
    if i were trying to guard server logs, and were limited to the current
    syslog as described in the informational RFC, i'd probably tunnel the
    syslog text, either using ssh as described by another writer, or using an
    IPSec applicance in front of a group of servers. i'd then configure things
    on the receiving end of the syslog stream to only accept messages that come
    from the tunnel.
    
    another option, which might take a little development, or which someone
    might already have out there, is to replace syslogd on the server(s) you
    wish to monitor with a modified version which could, say, log locally and
    also forward the messages over something like stunnel to a suitably
    configured syslogd on the receiving end.
    
    if i were modifying syslogd in this manner, i'd probably also take the
    opportunity to install some code that computes running hashes (MD5 or SHA1)
    and sends them someplace "safe" to provide a method of checking data
    integrity at a later date.
    
    richard
    --
    Richard Welty                                          Averill Park Networking
    rweltyat_private           Unix, Linux, IP Network Engineering, Security
    rwelty@krusty-motorsports.com                                     518-573-7592
    
    
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