> A zero knowledge pen test
> should be the starting point of an audit,
I couldn't disagree more. A pen test is not an
audit. An audit, by it's very nature, assumes
that the information infrastructure is being
compared to some standard. Ideally, this standard
will be supplied by the available corporate
information security policies. Absent these (as
is the case many times), some other more arbitrary
standard must be used. This alternate standard
should be based on the consultant's understanding
of the business needs of the client.
The entire information infrastructure should be
examined in this audit (what I referred to in an
earlier post as a vulnerability assessment). This
includes informal and undocumented procedures and
processes, as well as actual host settings and
configurations.
A pen test, by it's very nature, only focuses on a
relatively small portion of the infrastructure,
that being the public interface of the
organization. So much more information can be
learned by examining as much of the infrastructure
as possible (including interviews of key
personnel, etc). This data is then analyzed in
the context of the client's business, and then the
final deliverable presents that analysis in a
manner that is useful and pertinent to the client.
The only real usefulness of a pen test is to test
the reactions of the incident response team. If a
router ACL or host configuration setting is
applied and verified, you don't then need someone
to try and break in from the outside just to
verify it again.
Further benefits of a vulnerability assessment
include the knowledge transfer that goes on
between the consultant and the client. The
consultant does no one any good if he disappears
into a room and produces a magical report in a
vacuum. Consultants must work closely with
sysadmins at the client site...after all, after
the consultants are gone, the sysadmins are left
with whatever's there, whether they understand it
or not. Besides, working closely with the admins
builds trust and adds credibility...which leads to
a relationship and follow-on work.
> Regarding studies like CSI/FBI survey,
For the sake of the readers and the moderators
alike, I will refrain from my usuaul diatribe
regarding quoting such things as this survey...and
particularly this survey.
> more or less, the 1st test will cover
> about 20-30% of the potencial attackers while
the 2nd will cover the others
> 70-80%.
I would argue that a well-planned vulnerability
assessment, if delivered properly, and if the
necessary changes are made, will result in
protecting the client from 90% or more of both
internal and external threats.
I say this b/c the reports I have delivered stress
the need for policies, and for recognizing that
security is a process, that must be continually
maintained.
> The 1st test should be much longer in time and
resources, and usually the
> clients here don't understant quiet well where
their money goes.
So why should they pay it?
> So most of
> the times clients prefer to contract the 2nd
test only, because it takes
> less time and money. Also, that's why after that
their systems are still
> vulnerable.
That doesn't make any sense. Even if the second
test is contracted only, the final deliverable
should be clear enough such that if the documented
issues are addressed, the client won't be _as
vulnerable_ as they were.
> It is important for the client that a little
education is provided,
Again, I disagree. It is important for a client
that _a lot_ of education is provided. This means
not only up front during the sales process, but
also during the assessment, and afterward, when
the deliverable is presented, as well.
> And also,
> why pen tests should be regular, each month or 2
or 6 or whatever ...
I agree with regular testing...but is it really
necessary? See below...
> An
> audit will only cover a specific period of time,
so it is not anyway and not
> anyhow a garantee that in the (short) future
problems will not happen.
Of course not. That goes without saying for the
security professionals, and should be clearly
communicated to the client. However, if the
consulting firm does it's job and adequately
communicates the concept that security is an
ongoing process ("Mr. Client, you need to install
these patches, and in the future you may also need
to install others...as they come out."), then it's
in the clients hands. At that point, if they
choose not to follow the advice...so be it.
> At the technical side and at the commercial side
for both parts (consultant
> and client), the more audits in a period of time
are made, the better the
> investiment and the results.
That's not necessary. The disruption to a
client's infrastructure is unacceptable. The
appropriate way to conduct these things is to
conduct a comprehensive vulnerability
assessment...planned so as not to engage any one
portion of the infrastructure for too long...and
provide the recommendations in the deliverable.
The client can then map out a timeframe for
completing what he feels are the necessary steps,
as communicated by the consulting firm. This
could be 6 months, or a year. Re-examining the
infrastructure after a specified period is advisable.
Remember, it's the client that drives the boat,
not the consulting firm. The client pays,
therefore the golden rule applies.
> Some security consulting companies will not give
away clients references,
> because keeping confidential other companies
with past or present security
> problem is part of the contract with a client.
Security companies that provide references (and
many do) do so only after their clients approve.
Simply b/c a security consulting company does an
audit doesn't mean that the client had a "security
problem" at all. In fact, many companies use
comprehensive audits/assessments performed by big
named firms to show due diligence.
Basically, the way it works is this...security
company "A" asks client "B" if they can use the
client as a reference. Client "B" says yes, with
stipulations that the exact nature of the work not
be described ("we did a security assessment for
client B"). Then potential client "C" calls
client "B", and client "B" says, "yes, these guys
do good work." Simple, yes, but that's basically it.
If someone had a "security problem" (i.e., an
"incident")...no, of course the wouldn't want it
publicly known. But the security firm that did
the work wouldn't ask, either.
> Other problem can be also giving away
> models and methods, because there are many
smartasses that are just looking
> after knowledge to do the job themselfs.
By "smartasses", I guess you mean "potential
clients". Yes, these folks are out there...I've
seen them, as I'm sure others have. Yet there is
nothing to prevent either party from requiring
NDAs before going forward.
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