RE: Can you impersonate a client side cert??

From: Ed Moyle (emoyleat_private)
Date: Tue Jan 29 2002 - 06:22:55 PST

  • Next message: Viraf Hathiram: "GPRS vulnerabilities"

    On Monday, January 28, 2002 17:32 pmawsonat_private wrote:
    
    > Phrack #57 - Hang on, Snoopy (by stealth)
    >   http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=57&a=13
    > Here in lies the answer to your question.
    
    It should be noted that this article *only applies* to CAs that are unknown to the browser and is focused primarily on server certs used for SSL.  With respect to client-side certs, the web server will only trust certs issued by a known, valid CA.  In most applications, servers only trust certs issued by a particular CA (perhaps a local CA) and not the universe of possible commercial CA's that are available by default in the web server (since commercial CAs typically have pretty week auth criteria - Verisign, for example lets you get one for "test purposes" using just your email address.)  So, using a spurious CA that you control is (usually) out of the question.  
    
    If you can get a *trusted* CA to issue you a cert with a CN that you can control (this is not always easy to do,) the only way you can impersonate is if the application uses custom-written software that checks only the CN and not any other information on the cert.  This is not a common practice for exactly the reason that is being discussed.  Many times the SN is used, which is unique per CA.  
    
    Some resources regarding mapping a cert to a user in particular environments:
    
    Microsoft has an article on how this is set up w/ IIS.  Check out: http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/planning/security/mappingcerts.asp
    
    IBM has a similar article for websphere:
    http://www-4.ibm.com/software/webservers/appserv/doc/v35/ae/infocenter/was/050505.html
    
    Note that in both cases, doing a mapping based on CN where *more than one CA is trusted* and/or *uniqueness of CN is not enforced* is incredibly dangerous and hence is typicaly avoided...  At the very least, DN should be used.
    
    Just my $.02...
    -E
    
    
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This list is provided by the SecurityFocus Security Intelligence Alert (SIA)
    Service. For more information on SecurityFocus' SIA service which
    automatically alerts you to the latest security vulnerabilities please see:
    https://alerts.securityfocus.com/
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Tue Jan 29 2002 - 10:25:30 PST