Re: a real way to stop an http based worm

From: The Crocodile (tcrocat_private)
Date: Fri Sep 07 2001 - 19:36:48 PDT

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    The router ACL solution really depends upon the size and design of your
    network.  For example I am currently employed at a VERY large network (Read
    as one of the single largest in the US).  When code red II hit us inside our
    perimeter we used router ACLs to block port 80 in its entirety in our
    Intranet  (We have proxies for valid traffic).  However we could not
    implement any more additional ACL's, especially ACL's that did any type of
    packet inspection at a more detailed level.  That would have been VERY
    detrimental to our networks health.  We did try to do additional router ACLs
    and sure enough the entire router ground to a halt.  With time and patience
    we managed to contain and eradicate.  ACLs on 80 helped but was only a small
    subset of the solution.  When you are in an environment as big as ours
    normal solutions usually won't cut the mustard :{
    
    It is a very good solution but one that will not work in every environment
    (Trust me I wish it did)
    
    --TCroc
    
    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Jose Nazario" <joseat_private>
    To: "Gert-Jan Hagenaars" <blenderat_private>
    Cc: <vuln-devat_private>
    Sent: Friday, September 07, 2001 2:47 PM
    Subject: Re: a real way to stop an http based worm
    
    
    > On Fri, 7 Sep 2001, Gert-Jan Hagenaars wrote:
    >
    > > Can this be done on the web-proxy boxes that the ISPs have on their
    > > networks?  I.e. dunk anything that looks for "/default.ida?blah"?
    >
    > yep. reverse proxies can be configured to do this. and cisco ACLs can
    > already reset/block such connections i believe.
    >
    > in short a good idea, and one that can already be implemented.
    >
    > ____________________________
    > jose nazario      joseat_private
    >            PGP: 89 B0 81 DA 5B FD 7E 00  99 C3 B2 CD 48 A0 07 80
    >        PGP key ID 0xFD37F4E5 (pgp.mit.edu)
    >
    >
    



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