RE: Malicious use of grc.com

From: H C (keydet89at_private)
Date: Wed Nov 28 2001 - 12:52:04 PST

  • Next message: John Scimone: "Re: Audiogalaxy again (Cross Site Scripting Vuln)"

    > a) Mr. Gibson has made publicly available a scanning
    > tool that can serve
    > as an anonymous scanning tool against any potential
    > hosts. 
    
    At the end of the day, all it is is a port scan.  So
    far no one has presented any information that shows
    that Gibson's site can be used to take advantage of
    the port scanning information and conduct a direct
    attack against the target system.  
    
    It's a port scan...so what?
    
    Also, I have not seen anything more than claims
    regarding the DoS issue.
    
    > b) Mr. Gibson has been VERY vocal about his security
    > skills and views on
    > several subjects including the snafu with M$'s TCP
    > stack. Several people
    > have observed the irony of someone that seems like a
    > security expert to
    > post a program on his site that is vulnerable to
    > some kind of exploit.
    
    Like that never happens?  So where's Magni's advisory
    on the uses of NetCraft?  And where's the advisory
    regarding the content of the Incident's list on SF? 
    After all, it wasn't so long ago that some admin got
    on the list and posted pretty explicit info regarding
    the structure of his DMZ...obviating the need for
    Gibson's site all together.
    
    Attacking anyone, regardless of whether they are wrong
    or right, simply b/c they are vocal serves no purpose.
     
    > c) There have been statements from Mr. Gibson that
    > 1) the problem has
    > been existent for at least two years and 2) he does
    > not find it
    > significant enough based on other factors (how many
    > checks you can
    > spawn, only 200 bytes/sec) to deal with it quite
    > yet.
    
    To be correct, Gibson's statement was 400 bytes, not
    200.  But that isn't the point at all.  Someone posted
    that an attack could be scripted to perform a DoS
    attack...Gibson said that wasn't true.  
    
    > d) People have taken sides on this issue. One sides
    > views this as equal
    > as "hacking the Gibson" (sorry, I couldn't resist
    > ;)) while the other
    > finds it quite insignificant and not even worth
    > making an advisory about.
    
    Your breakdown is a little too simplistic.  For
    example, I have no problem with an advisory being
    posted.  I do have questions regarding the content of
    the advisory...my initial queries to Magni about
    vendor contact didn't reveal anything about Gibson
    knowing about this issue for two years.  In fact,
    another member of HoG was the first to inform me of
    this.
     
    > Was the finding significant enough for an advisory?
    > Hell yes. While
    > ironic it also provided us with an issue that's hot
    > enough to generate
    > discussion amongst ourselves. And that is the
    > reprecautions one should
    > take before posting the latest "cool" security tool
    > on his/her site
    > without first investigating all the angles. 
    
    Or posting an advisory without following any of the
    various processes out there.
    
    > And as security experts we
    > are all kinda blown away that once a flaw is found
    > the author does not take steps to fix this. 
    
    Not at all.  As "security experts" (I hesitate to use
    that term, as I consider myself more of a professional
    than expert, and all that word entails), we are also
    familiar with a wide variety of other issues.  
    
    For example, consider Code Red.  How many web sites do
    you know of that actually need the functionality
    provided by the ida/idq script mappings?  As of yet, I
    haven't seen any...that doesn't mean that there aren't
    any.  So, if the functionality isn't needed, why not
    simply disable the script mapping?  Do that at
    install, and the system wouldn't have been infected by
    Code Red.   The same holds for sadmin/IIS
    (poisonbox)...the patch necessary was about 7 months
    old when the worm hit.
    
    The point is...we have all seen how people either make
    a decision (or fail to do so) to NOT fix something. 
    Gibson evidently (based on his comments that I've seen
    on DSLReports) decided that the issue didn't merit
    attention.  After all, it's just another port scanner.
    
    > Top that is the irony of the
    > individual creating
    > the flawed software and you got a nifty advisory. I
    > seriously see
    > nothing wrong with that.
    
    Nor do I.  However, the advisory wasn't a very good
    example of responsible disclosure.
    
    > And to touch briefly about port scanning: While it's
    > true it's not
    > illegal, there is nothing that stops you, the
    > network engineers from
    > taking any action necessary to protect your network
    > from scans. 
    
    Sure.  There's no problem with that.  And if everyone
    took the necessary steps to protect their networks,
    there wouldn't be a problem at all.  In fact, there
    are even Registry entries that can mitigate the
    effects of SYN floods, assuming that the packets
    aren't already blocked by routers and firewalls before
    they reach a target host.  Therefore, this issue of
    using Gibson's site to conduct DoS attacks (again, so
    far it's only a claim, I haven't seen it actually
    work, nor am I aware of anyone suffering from such an
    attack) is a non-issue, as well.
    
    
    
    
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